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Abstract 
Using an event study approach on a sample of 72 acquisitions by Norwegian listed firms we study 
the effect of CEO stock and options based incentives on abnormal return and risk change 
associated with M&A activity. Our focus is on the bidder firms’ pre-acquisition incentive structures 
and its effect on the abnormal return and risk change from the transaction.  
The regression analysis we perform supports the hypothesis that cultural differences lead to different 
effects of equity based incentives in Norwegian compared to US firms. We find that CEO stock 
options decrease bidder shareholder returns in M&A, while CEO stock ownership has a non-
significant negative influence. Both incentive structures have an insignificant impact on the CEOs’ 
risk taking behavior. Accordingly, we cannot recommend that shareholders use stocks or options to 
reduce agency problems. 
The thesis provides a platform on which shareholders in Norwegian firms can build their decisions 
regarding the optimal incentive contract for their CEO. However, our limited sample and the lack of 
supportive research for other markets outside the US, does not allow for generalizing our findings to 
markets outside Norway. 
  
4 
 
 
  
5 
 
Table of  Contents 
1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 9 
2 The Nature of Mergers and Acquisitions and the Reasoning behind Executive 
Compensation .......................................................................................................................... 11 
2. 1 Mergers and Acquisitions as Value Creators .................................................................... 11 
2.1.1 Changes in the M&A market ................................................................................................................ 11 
2.1.2 Profitability of M&A .............................................................................................................................. 12 
2.1.3 Motives for M&A ................................................................................................................................... 12 
2.2 Executive Compensation in Light of Agency Theory ....................................................... 13 
2.2.1 The Effect of Different Stock Based Incentive Structures .............................................................. 14 
2.2.2 Development in Executive Compensation ......................................................................................... 15 
3 Literature Review and Development of Hypotheses ........................................................... 17 
3.1 Impact of Bidding Executive Compensation on Propensity to Acquire and Abnormal 
Return ...................................................................................................................................... 18 
3.1.1 Stock Ownership is Non-Linearly related to Abnormal Returns .................................................... 19 
3.1.2 Stock Options are positively related to Abnormal Returns ............................................................. 21 
3.1.3 Equity Based Compensation (EBC) is positively related to Abnormal Returns ........................... 22 
3.1.4 Long-Term Incentive Plans increase Abnormal Returns through Long-Term Alignment of 
Goals .................................................................................................................................................................. 23 
3.2 Impact of Bidding Executive Incentive Structures on Risk Taking and Diversification . 24 
3.2.1 Stock Ownership is Non-Linearly related to CEO Risk Taking ..................................................... 25 
3.2.2 Stock Options increase CEO Risk Taking ......................................................................................... 26 
3.2.3 The Presence of Blockholders has a Monitoring Effect on CEO Risk Taking ............................ 28 
4 Methodology ......................................................................................................................... 31 
4.1 The Event Study Approach ................................................................................................ 31 
4.2 Hypothesis Testing ............................................................................................................ 34 
4.2.1 Definition of Variables .......................................................................................................................... 34 
4.2.2 Regression Analysis ................................................................................................................................ 36 
5 Data ....................................................................................................................................... 39 
5.1 Sample Construction .......................................................................................................... 39 
5.2 Sample Description ............................................................................................................ 39 
5.2.1 Statistical Properties of Return Data ................................................................................................... 39 
 ............................................................................................................................................................................ 40 
5.2.2 Statistical Properties of Volatility Data ............................................................................................... 41 
5.2.3 Control Variables and Sample Characteristics ................................................................................... 42 
6 
 
6 The impact of stock based compensation on risk and return from M&A ........................... 45 
6.1 Factors Affecting Return from M&A Decisions ................................................................ 46 
6.1.1 Stock Ownership .................................................................................................................................... 46 
6.1.2 Stock Options ......................................................................................................................................... 47 
6.1.3 Size, Blockholders and LTIP ................................................................................................................ 48 
6.1.4 Sub-sample Analysis ............................................................................................................................... 48 
6.2 Factors Affecting Risk Change as a Consequence of M&A Decisions............................. 49 
6.2.1 Stock Ownership .................................................................................................................................... 50 
 ............................................................................................................................................................................ 50 
 ............................................................................................................................................................................ 50 
6.2.2 Stock Options ......................................................................................................................................... 51 
6.2.3 Size, Blockholders and LTIP ................................................................................................................ 51 
6.2.4 Sub-sample Analysis ............................................................................................................................... 51 
6.3 Monetary Effect of Results ................................................................................................ 52 
7 Discussion and Recommendations ...................................................................................... 53 
8 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................ 57 
References................................................................................................................................ 59 
Appendix A: Summary of Literature Review ........................................................................... 64 
Appendix B: Comparison to earlier research .......................................................................... 66 
Appendix C: Regression results including outlier data……………………………………….68  
Appendix D: Deal information for the full sample……………………………………………69 
 
  
7 
 
List of  Figures 
Figure 2.1: Characteristics of the six merger waves 11 
Figure 2.2: The value of stocks and stock options as the stock price changes 14 
Figure 2.3: The relationship between total compensation and EBC 15 
Figure 2.4: Development in executive pay in the period 1936 - 2005 for the 50 largest US firms in 1940, -60 
and -80 16 
Figure 3.1: The collected research on the relationship between CEO incentive structures and CAR for 
bidding firms 18 
Figure 3.2: The non-linear relationship between CEO stock ownership and CAR 20 
Figure 3.3:  Comparison of the incentive effect of EBC, stock ownership and stock options on abnormal 
returns 22 
Figure 3.4: Summarized results from the collective research on the relationship between CEO incentive 
structures and risk taking 24 
Figure 3.5: The relationship between asset price and the option price sensitivity to risk (δc/δς) as given by 
the Black-Scholes Pricing Model 27 
Figure 3.6: The relationship between the volatility of the underlying asset and utility of holding options 27 
Figure 4.1: The eight steps in an event study 31 
Figure 4.2: The Event Periods T0-T3 31 
Figure 4.3: Overview of event windows from reviewed literature 32 
Figure 5.1: Distribution of CAR in the sample 40 
Figure 5.2: Distribution of volatility difference in the sample 41 
Figure 5.3: The correlation between CAR and volatility difference in the sample 41 
Figure 5.4: The market capitalization (mNOK) of the firms in the sample 42 
Figure 5.5: Overview of blockholder ownership and firms with LTIP in our sample 43 
Figure 5.6: Overview of total compensation for CEOs in the sample 43 
Figure 5.7: Distribution of stock ownership and stock options in the sample 44 
Figure 5.8: Overview of number of transactions through our ten-year sample period 44 
Figure 6.1: Summarized results of the regression analyses for the full sample 45 
Figure 6.2: The relationship between Stock Ownership Ratio and CAR 47 
Figure 6.3: The relationship between stock option ratio and CAR 47 
Figure 6.4: The relationship between stock ownership ratio and volatility difference 50 
Figure 6.5: The relationship between stock ownership ratio and squared volatility difference  50 
 
List of  tables 
 
Table 4.1: Regression model variables 36 
Table 6.1: Results from the regression analysis on CAR 46 
Table 6.2: Results from regression analysis on volatility difference  49 
Table 6.3: Results from regression analysis on volatility difference2  49 
 
8 
 
 
 
 
  
9 
 
1 Introduction 
The last decades have seen a huge transformation in the M&A market. From the 1980s where M&A 
was largely a US phenomenon, Europe and the rest of the world embraced the trend as we entered 
the new millennium. Specifically, we have seen an explosion in the Norwegian M&A market from a 
total deal value of 1,1 mUSD in 1993 to a median value of 1143 mUSD in the period 2003-2009. 
The latter period also included the record year 2006, where the Statoil-Hydro merger contributed to 
a total deal value of 34 838 mUSD.  
 
Low or negative bidder returns have been a worldwide issue since the birth of M&A, and 
researchers have labored to find explanations and solutions. Agency theory has been a popular 
choice to explain the motives of the CEO in M&A decision-making, but to the best of our 
knowledge, all research available on the field of agency theory in the M&A context focuses on US 
firms (Amland & Line, 2010). The shift in the M&A market has created a need for M&A research to 
broaden the perspective to other areas of the world than the US. Particularly in the area of CEO 
motives, where cultural differences are likely to cause significant differences, we see a need for more 
country specific research. We have chosen Norway as our country of focus both because of the 
great increase in M&A activity in recent years, but also because we expect that cultural differences 
will make Norway an interesting county to compare with the US. According to the Geert Hofstede 
Cultural Dimensions (2011), there are significant cultural differences between the two countries, 
particularly with regards to the masculine-feminine dimension, where the US is very masculine 
whereas Norway is one of the world’s most feminine countries.  
 
Our focus is to find the optimal incentive structure to minimize the agency problems between 
CEOs and shareholders in the decision to acquire another firm. In addition we have tried to 
discover cultural and regional differences between the US market and the Norwegian market in the 
light of M&A and CEO incentive structure. We have limited the scope of the thesis to concern the 
pre-acquisition incentive structures in bidder firms and we analyze the issue through consideration 
of two major areas in agency theory: value creation and risk taking. Agency theory predicts that any 
situation where the interests of the two parties diverge will lead to similar problems. We therefore 
believe that the recommendations for an optimal contract found in this thesis will reduce agency 
problems not only in the context of M&A, but for other investment decisions as well.  
 
We have conducted a comprehensive literature review of US research, upon which we build our 
hypotheses. We then tested our hypotheses on a sample of 68 Norwegian public acquirers with a 
total of 72 transactions in the period between 1999 and 2009. We have used the event study 
methodology to gather information about the change in risk and return around the acquisition 
announcement, and have used annual reports to find data on incentive structures. We have analyzed 
the relationship between the variables we have found with a multivariate regression model. The 
methodology we have used is in line with the tradition in existent research; hence our main 
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contribution to the research area is our focus on another region than the US –Norway.  
 
Based on the regression results we have not been able to establish a significant relationship between 
stock ownership, risk and return, but see a weak negative trend to both risk and return. This is in 
contradiction to what we hypothesized based on the US literature. Based on the reasoning that it is 
costly for shareholders to award stocks, our final recommendation is to refrain from rewarding 
shares to their CEO, as the effect of awarding them is uncertain. Stock options have a significant 
negative relationship to returns, and a non-significant impact on risk taking. Hence, we also 
recommend that shareholders refrain from awarding stock options to their CEO. 
We do not find significant influence from long term incentive plans (LTIP) on abnormal returns and 
hence do not have a basis for giving clear recommendations with regards to this incentive 
mechanism. Size is only found to have a significantly negative impact on return and positively 
impact on risk through the sub-sample analysis for firms with stock ownership and stock options, 
respectively. Based on a sub-sample analysis of firms with stock options we find blockholders to be 
positively related to risk and can therefore conclude that shareholders that are active in designing 
incentive structures can expect reduced agency problems. 
 
We have structured the thesis with Section 2 as an introductory section to the fields of M&A and 
agency theory and with a literature review in Section 3. Section 4 explains the methodology used in 
the thesis, while Section 5 presents the data on which we base our analysis. Section 6 presents the 
results of the regression analysis with a discussion of its implications in Section 7. At last, Section 8 
is the conclusion of the thesis.  
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2 The Nature of  Mergers and Acquisitions 
and the Reasoning behind Executive 
Compensation 
2. 1 Mergers and Acquisitions as Value Creators 
Mergers, Acquisitions and M&A are used interchangeably to describe a transaction where two 
entities are combined, even though the terms actually have different meanings. A merger is defined 
as a transaction where two companies join together voluntarily and the merged company is 
commonly renamed to mark that the companies are equal. Acquisitions are traditionally perceived to 
be more hostile due to the fact that the bidder takes control over the target entirely. In practice, very 
few transactions are true mergers, but many acquisitions are masked as mergers to be perceived 
more positively by the target firm. However, we will not distinguish between mergers and 
acquisitions in this thesis, but rather follow in the footsteps of researchers before us that have 
studied the M&A as a unified concept. 
2.1.1 Changes in the M&A market 
According to Bodolica and Spraggon (2009) there have been six merger waves in the US market in 
the period 1897-2007, each characterized by different transaction trends. An overview of the 
characteristics of each merger wave can be seen in Figure 2.1. During the first wave (1897-1921), 
horizontal mergers dominated the scene and consolidated the market. The second wave (1922-1964) 
saw transactions that increased the vertical integration of merging companies. Conglomerate 
mergers characterized the third wave (1965-1969), but as many of these transactions failed, the 
fourth wave (1984-1989) took a turn towards higher specialization, hostile takeovers and leveraged 
buyouts (Holmstrom and Kaplan, 2001). In the fifth wave (1992-2001) acquisitions tended towards 
strategic deals and were dominated by the internet-bubble. The most striking features of the sixth 
wave (2004-2007) is the globalization of M&A, the record numbers of transactions and the size of 
the deals.  
As the nature of the transactions has changed over the years, so has the geographic distribution. 
While the US accounted for about 80% of both the size and value of worldwide transactions in the 
beginning of the 1980s, it was down to 46% between 1997 and 2006. In the same period, Europe’s 
market share rose from 10% to 30% (BCG, 2007). Norway also experienced a significant growth in 
its M&A activity in the period, with a rise in total deal value from 1,1 mUSD in 1993 to 6,8 mUSD 
in 1997 (Lovenskiold, 1998). As this change in the market composition is rather recent, most of the 
research on the M&A phenomenon has focused on the US.  
 
 
1st wave 
1897-1904 
Horizontal 
2nd wave 
1916-1929 
Vertical 
3rd wave 
1965-1969 
Diversify 
4th wave 
1984-1989 
Specialize 
5th wave 
1992-2001 
Strategic 
6th wave 
2004-2007 
Global 
Figure 2.1: Characteristics of the six merger waves. Source: Bodolica & Spraggon (2009). 
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2.1.2 Profitability of M&A 
Throughout the waves, the abnormal returns have followed a relatively stable pattern. According to 
Loughran and Vijh (1997), researchers find three typical patterns regarding wealth gains from 
acquisitions: target shareholders earn significantly positive abnormal returns from all acquisitions, 
acquiring shareholders earn little or no abnormal returns from tender offers, and acquiring 
shareholders earn negative abnormal returns from mergers. An analysis by BCG (2007) of the 
worldwide cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) in the period 1996-2006 confirms this view. They 
find that the average acquirer CAR is -1,2%, while the average target CAR is 18,6%. For the 
combined sample the average CAR is 1,8%, showing that M&A create value on average, although it 
is at the expense of the acquirers. In the same study, BCG finds that there are regional differences 
between Europe and North America. While 47% of the deals in Europe created value for the 
bidding shareholders, only 38% did so in North America. However, still over 50% of the deals both 
in North America and Europe do not create value for the bidding shareholders. Scholtens and 
DeWik (2004) confirm the finding of higher returns for European than American bidders.  
2.1.3 Motives for M&A 
Different motives have been advanced in the literature aiming to explain the incessant occurrence of 
M&A in spite of the well-documented evidence of post-acquisition underperformance for bidding 
firms.  Based on previous literature, Wright, Kroll, Lado and Van Ness (2002) presents four motives 
for M&A; the desire for synergies, the fact that acquirers can extract value because target companies 
have been managed inefficiently, managerial hubris, and anticipation that firm expansion will 
positively impact the compensation of top managers. The hubris hypotheses put forward by Roll 
(1986) predicts that bidding firms infected by hubris simply pay too much for their targets because 
they believe that their valuation of the firm is correct and that the market is wrong. While the two 
first motives are rooted in an attempt to create shareholder value, the last motives are based on the 
assumption that managers will exploit their position of power to pursue personal motives, rather 
than act on the behalf of the shareholders. This conflict between managers and shareholders is 
described by agency theory. 
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2.2 Executive Compensation in Light of Agency Theory 
According to agency theory, an agency problem arises when two cooperating parties have different 
goals and the person delegating the work is different from the person performing the work 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). Agency theory aims to explain and resolve two problems related to an agency 
relationship. The first is the agency problem, stemming from the fact that the desires and goals of 
the cooperating parties are divergent and that it is difficult or expensive for the principal (the party 
that delegates the work) to monitor the actions of the agent (the party performing the work).  The 
second is the problem of risk sharing that arises due to the agent being more risk averse than the 
principal. This difference in risk preferences can lead the agent to turn down positive NPV projects, 
that the principal would want them to take, if the agent deems the projects too risky. To solve these 
problems, agency theory focuses on the contract governing the relationship between the agent and 
the principal, and more specifically on the efficiency of behavior based contracts (salaries, 
hierarchies etc.) versus outcome-based contracts (stock options, market governance etc.). 
The separation of ownership and control between the stockholders and managers in a corporation 
fits the definition of a pure agency relationship (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The general assumption 
on CEOs being more risk averse than the shareholders is based on the reasoning that shareholders 
have access to a perfect market, where their unsystematic risk can be completely hedged. The CEO 
on the other hand, has all her human capital invested in the firm, without the ability to diversify her 
risk. To close this gap, agency theory proposes the use of incentive based contracts and governance 
structures (Eisenhardt, 1989). For a risk neutral CEO, the optimal contract is one that dictates a 
one-to-one relationship between company performance and CEO pay (Hall & Liebman, 1998). 
However, as CEOs are assumed to be risk averse, they would have to be compensated for the risk in 
such a contract. For a large firm facing annual standard deviations of several billion dollars, this 
contract would be extremely costly for the shareholders. As a consequence of this bonus schemes, 
stock based pay and other performance based remuneration are more popular.   
Researchers have criticized the assumptions of CEO risk aversion and shareholder risk neutrality. 
Several find investors to be under diversified and therefore likely to care about ﬁrm speciﬁc risk 
(Barber and Odean, 2000; Benartzi, 2001; Goetzmann and Kumar, 2002). While others (Gervais, 
Heaton and Odean, 2003) argue that the overconfidence of some managers can lead them to be less 
risk averse than a fully rational manager would be. This prediction implies that an overconfident 
manager would require less economic incentives than generally assumed in agency theory, for her 
risk preferences to be aligned to those of the shareholders. The need for economic incentives would 
be further reduced if the shareholders’ diversifications of their portfolios were suboptimal. Berle, 
Belsom and Strønen (2009) also argue that a reduction in the use of stock option contracts would be 
beneficial. They find that stock options are ill suited to align managers’ and shareholders’ interests, 
as managers rewarded with stock options have incentives to take excessive risk at a cost to the 
shareholders. Furthermore, Cheng and Warfield (2005) argue that equity incentives lead to 
incentives for earnings management. 
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Nevertheless, empirical studies show that outcome-based incentive contracts such as executive stock 
holdings (Agrawal and Mandelker, 1987) are effective in moderating agency problems. Monitoring 
of the CEO by the board of directors, debtholders, or institutional blockholders can also have an 
important impact on the economic performance of a firm and can be used to minimize agency 
problems (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen, 1989). As it appears, the type of compensation offered to 
the executives is an important tool to resolve agency problems. The next section will give a more 
detailed view on the specific incentive effects of different forms of compensation. 
2.2.1 The Effect of Different Stock Based Incentive Structures 
The different incentive mechanisms presented here are stock ownership, stock options, equity based 
compensation and long-term incentive plans. Boards can use stock based compensation as an 
incentive to discourage managerial opportunism, promote shareholder-wealth-maximizing behavior, 
and achieve higher levels of firm performance (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). However, different 
types of stock based compensation will have different incentive effect on the receiving manager. The 
difference between the incentive effect of stock options and stock ownership can be understood by 
looking at how the value of the security changes with stock price in Figure 2.2. Stock ownership 
rewards the executive for creating shareholder value, but punishes the executive if the value of the 
stock declines, as the reward is directly related to the stock price. The theoretical incentive effect of 
stock ownership is thus twofold. On the one hand, stock ownership will tie the executive’s 
incentives closer to the shareholders’ and should therefore increase the risk taking behavior of the 
executive. On the other hand, the fact that the executive now has both her human capital and her 
financial wealth tied to the firm’s performance could make her more risk-averse in her actions. 
As can be seen in Figure 2.2, an option that is out-of-the-money has a lower downside risk than a 
stock since the lowest value it can take is zero. Executives who hold out-of-the-money stock options 
will thus have a stronger incentive to increase their risk taking behavior than the executive who 
Figure 2.2: The value of stocks and stock options as the stock price changes. 
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holds stocks. However, the risk incentive of the option changes with the stock price. While a stock 
option that is out-of-the-money will have strong risk increasing properties, a deep in-the-money 
option will have the same risk incentives as a stock. Due to the varying risk incentives, the optimal 
level of option compensation is difficult to ascertain theoretically.  
  
Several researchers use equity based compensation (EBC) as a group measure for stock option pay 
and stock grants. As seen in Figure 2.3, EBC captures the effect on managers of introducing stock 
based compensation into their incentive structure. However, the measure does not give insight into 
the difference in the incentive effects of stock options and stocks. Nor does it capture the incentive 
effect of the stocks or stock options that the CEOs themselves have purchased. 
Another incentive mechanism is the use of a Long-Term Incentive Plan (LTIP). This is an incentive 
contract between the board of directors and the CEO where the board of directors sets accounting 
performance targets for a period that is usually between 3 to 5 years, and the CEO is rewarded if 
these are met (Travolos and Waegelein, 1992). Another form of LTIP can be a stock based incentive 
scheme that has vesting periods of at least 3 years. LTIP can influence management to make 
decisions to maximize the firm’s long-term earnings (Tehrainian et al., 1987). Short-term bonus 
plans, on the other hand, may motivate managers to select a transaction that yields positive effects 
on earnings and cash flows in the short-term, but negative effects in the long-term. This issue can be 
caused by board pressure for immediate book profits or by the manager’s lack of concern for cash 
flows after retirement (Smith and Watts, 1982). Hence, LTIP seems to be well suited for the 
alignment of interests between managers and shareholders in the long run. 
2.2.2 Development in Executive Compensation 
As mentioned, the type of compensation offered to an executive can reduce the company’s agency 
problems. It is therefore important to have an overview of the development in compensation 
contracts over the last couple of decades to understand the context of the studies we will look at 
later in the thesis. The market for M&A has changed over the years, and so have the trends in 
compensation. Looking at Figure 2.4, it is easy to see that while stock grants and stock option pay 
have been in use for several decades, it took off in the 1980s. Stock options reached a peak in the 
late 90’s where stock option pay contributed to 37% of total CEO pay (Frydman & Saks, 2007). 
Figure 2.3: The relationship between total compensation and EBC. 
Total compensation 
 Equity based compensation (EBC) 
Stock option 
pay 
Stock grants Bonus and 
salary 
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Looking at the same sample, Anderson, Collins, Pizzigati and Shih (2010) find that CEO pay in 2009 
is more than double of the CEO pay average for the 1990s and approximately eight times the CEO 
average for all the decades of the mid-20th century. Another example of the increase in the use of 
stock options can be seen in the pay-for-performance studies done by Jensen and Murhpy (1990) in 
the period 1969-1983 and Hall and Liebman (1998) in the period 1980-1994. The latter study finds a 
significantly higher pay-for-performance sensitivity than the former, and the authors believe the 
increase in stock option pay to be the reason for the divergence.   
 
Like the case for M&A, most studies on compensation have focused on the US. As our study will 
focus on Norwegian firms, we need an understanding of the differences between the two nations. A 
recent study compares CEO compensation across different countries. The study finds that the 
composition of pay differs greatly between the US and Norway. While Norwegian CEOs received 
25% of their total compensation as bonus and 15% as stocks and options, US CEOs received 27% 
as bonus and 39% as stocks and options. (Fernandes, Ferriera, Methos & Murphy, 2010). The results 
are based on fiscal year compensation data for 2006 and the sample includes 90% of both countries’ 
firms in terms of market capitalization. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4: Development in executive pay in the period 1936 to 2005 for the 50 largest US firms in 1940, 1960 
and 1980. Source: Frydman and Saks (2007). 
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3 Literature Review and Development of  
Hypotheses 
The association between executive incentive structures and M&A has been studied since the early 
1980’s and most of the research focuses on how executive incentive structures influence risk taking 
and abnormal returns in M&A. These two themes are both suited to evaluate the alignment of goals 
between shareholders and CEOs, as emphasized by agency theory. Studies regarding risk taking and 
diversification show that effective use of incentive structures can contribute to align the actions of a 
risk averse CEO to the risk preferences of the firm’s risk neutral shareholders. Furthermore, 
research on the impact of executive incentives on post-acquisition shareholder value demonstrates 
that incentive structures can increase the abnormal returns from an M&A transaction. CEO stock 
ownership and stock options appear to be the two most influential levers for affecting risk taking 
and abnormal returns in M&A by using executive incentive structures (Amland & Line, 2010). We 
have therefore chosen to focus on these mechanisms when we develop our hypotheses for our 
research on incentives in Norwegian M&A. Additionally, we see that the presence of blockholders 
and LTIP can be influential and we chose to include these as control variables for our study.  
We have found relevant articles for the review by using the comprehensive review article on 
incentive structures in the M&A context by Bodolica and Spraggon (2009) as a starting point. They 
identify three main streams of research: studies on executive incentives of bidding firms in the pre-
acquisition period, studies on executive incentives of target firms in the pre-acquisition period and 
studies on executive incentives of acquiring firms in the post-acquisition period. The focus in this 
study will be on the pre-acquisition incentive structure of bidding firms. The incentive structure of 
target firms and the incentives in the post-acquisition period is outside the scope of this study. In the 
review of pre-acquisition incentives in bidder firms, Bodolica and Spraggon (2009) consider the 
incentive effect on risk taking, abnormal returns and factors such as mode of payment and control 
premium. As our analysis will be based on agency theory, which main issues are connected to risk 
and maximization of shareholder value, the analysis will be focused on these two themes and 
exclude the incentive effect on mode of payment and control premium.  
 
The literature review considers all of the empirical studies reviewed in the relevant section of 
Bodolica and Spraggon (2009). To ensure that we do not miss any articles that the former 
researchers may have omitted, we have also conducted through searches in the database BIBSYS as 
well as Google Scholar. Through these searches we have found some complimentary research that 
has been omitted (e.g. Sudarsanam & Huang, 2006) or published subsequent to their review (e.g. 
Yang, Unal & Minnik, 2010). With one exception (Shekar & Torbey, 2005), all the studies 
considered have based their sample on US firms. Although the current research gives us a solid basis 
of knowledge on the general relationship between CEO incentives and success in M&A, we can 
clearly conclude that there is a complete lack of studies that investigates this relationship in a 
Norwegian, Nordic or even European context.   
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3.1 Impact of Bidding Executive Compensation on Propensity to Acquire and 
Abnormal Return 
The relationship between different types of incentive contracts and abnormal returns in M&A 
transactions, gives a clear indication of how the different incentive structures contribute to 
alignment of goals between the principal and the agent. Some researchers that we consider in the 
literature review look at the propensity to acquire, rather than the return in the acquisition as a 
measure of ther alignment between sharholders and CEOs. However, as CAR is the most widely 
used proxy for the alignment, we will primarily use this term in our discussion. We find that the 
relationship between stock ownership and CAR is the area of research where we find the most 
differentiated results in the collected research. As seen in Figure 3.1, the majority of researchers 
argue for a positive relationship, while others find non-linear and even negative relationships. For 
stock options on the other hand, the message is unanimous; stock options is positively related to 
abnormal returns. As mentioned, EBC combines stocks and stock options, and it is therefore not 
surprising that the research in this field provides somewhat diverging conclusions. Lastly, researchers 
on LTIP declare that they are, like stock options, positively related to abnormal returns. The 
following section will take a closer look at the different studies in each stream of research to try and 
find a summarizing conclusion and to form a basis for the hypothesis for our research on these 
relationships in Norwegian firms.  
  
EBC and CAR STOCK OWNERSHIP 
AND CAR 
STOCK OPTIONS AND 
CAR 
LTIP AND CAR 
Positive
Significant
Positive
Negative
Significant
Negative
Non-linear
Figure 3.1: The collected research on the relationship between CEO incentive structures and CAR for bidding 
firms. 
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3.1.1 Stock Ownership is Non-Linearly related to Abnormal Returns 
As seen in Figure 3.1, the majority of the research conducted on the effect of CEO 
stock ownership on abnormal returns from M&A indicates a positive relationship 
(Lewellen et al., 1985; Tehranian et al. 1987; Sanders, 2001). Lewellen et al.’s (1985) 
results suggest that substantial amounts of own-company share ownership help align 
the interests of stockholders and management. The reasoning is that the more stock 
they own, the more they stand to lose in the event of share price declines, and that this cost act as a 
counterweight to attempts to obtain other personal benefits through M&A. The study does not 
consider the potential trade-off the CEO will have to make between personal gains from risk 
reduction and stock related profits maximized by risk neutrality. Hence, it does not give a complete 
understanding of the incentive mechanism. A further weakness is found in the period for 
measurement of the abnormal returns. The CAR were measured from the time of the 
announcement of a merger bid through the stockholder approval date. This period was up to 286 
days and this length of the measuring period will allow randomly generated unrelated news to 
influence the abnormal return measured.  
Hanson and Song (1996) find a negative relationship, however this only applies for dual-class firms1. 
This relationship is likely to be caused by the existence of shares with preferential voting rights, 
where they found a significantly negative relation between value of control and abnormal returns 
which is not transferable to single-class firms. When they control for single-class firms they also find 
a negative relationship between abnormal returns and stock ownership, but the sample size is too 
small for the results to be important. Hence, we do not weight these results heavily in our 
conclusions.  
However, Wright et al. (2002) find results that unify the finding of both a positive and a negative 
relationship between stock ownership and abnormal returns. It seems that the positive relationship 
only applies when the amount of shareholdings constitutes a moderate portion of total CEO wealth. 
If the value of the shareholdings is larger than that the CEO is able to diversify some of the risk in 
his wealth portfolio, the relationship can turn negative. Figure 3.2 illustrates the non-linear 
relationship between stock ownership and the CAR from an acquisition that Wright et al. (2002) find 
in their research.  
 
                                                 
1 Dual class firms have two types of shares with disparate voting rights with regards to control 
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Figure 3.2: The non-linear relationship between CEO stock ownership and CAR. Source: Wright et al. (2002).  
Based on this relationship, they introduce the idea that stock ownership is productive where 
managerial wealth portfolios are not concentrated in the enterprise. Our interpretation is that the 
different results of Lewellen et al. (1985) and Wright et al. (2002) can be explained by the fact that 
while the former study measures stock ownership by percentage of total shares, the latter measures 
the dollar value. Wright et al. (2002) argues that a dollar value measure gives a better indication of 
the ratio of the total wealth of the CEO that is invested in the firm, and thereby the level of 
diversification. Lewellen et al. (1985) probably fails to capture the non-linear relationship due to the 
inability of their measure of stock ownership to capture the level of diversification of the CEO 
wealth.  
Based on this analysis, we conclude that the non-linear relationship seems to be the explanation that 
best explains the divergent results. This is in line with the findings in the risk focused stream of 
research, where a non-linear relationship also appears to be the cumulative finding. Consequently 
our hypothesis for stock ownership and abnormal returns is: 
Hypothesis 1a: The relationship between CEO stock ownership and abnormal returns resulting from an 
acquisition announcement will be positive for low levels of stock ownership and negative for high levels of stock 
ownership 
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3.1.2 Stock Options are positively related to Abnormal Returns 
Stock option holdings provide a greater risk increasing incentive for CEOs than 
stock ownership, and are also associated with higher abnormal returns. In the studies 
that focus on stock options as an incentive mechanism there is absolute agreement 
that stock option pay is significantly positively related to abnormal returns (Sanders, 
2001; Wright et al., 2002; Williams and Rao, 2006) as shown in Figure 3.1. Hence, 
stock option pay seems to be effective for increasing shareholder returns.  
Wright et al. (2002) find option values to promote corporate risk taking and enhance the abnormal 
returns of acquiring firms. They show that the CEO option holding variable is positive and 
significantly related to CAR, while the squared value of the same variable is insignificantly related to 
CAR. Rather than using percentage of ownership, they have used the actual values of shareholdings 
and/or options, because one percent of a $100 billion firm is most likely a greater portion of a 
manager’s wealth than one percent of a $100 million enterprise.  
Sanders (2001) discuss the use of stock options in the light of divesture activity. He believes option 
pay may serve as a useful tool for persuading executives to engage in more risk taking behavior than 
they would otherwise be willing to and hence act in line with the shareholders’ interests. He finds a 
significant positive relationship between return on assets and CEO option pay.  
Williams and Rao (2006) document a significant positive relationship between CEO stock options 
and subsequent equity return volatility. Their results support the notion that stock options are an 
effective means of motivating managers to increase their risk taking behavior. However, they find a 
considerable size effect to their results, were the risk incentive effect of stock options is larger for 
smaller firms. This emphasizes the importance of controlling for size. Williams, Michael and Rao 
(2008) did an additional study for the banking industry confirming results. In accordance with 
Wright et al. (2002), they also find a positive relation between stock options and abnormal returns.  
The wide agreement seen in this line of research makes it easy to hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 1b: The relationship between CEO stock option holdings and abnormal returns resulting from an 
acquisition announcement will be linear and positive 
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3.1.3 Equity Based Compensation (EBC) is positively related to Abnormal Returns  
As seen in Figure 3.1, the majority of the research finds that EBC is positively related 
to abnormal returns (Bliss and Rosen, 2001; Datta et al., 2001; Travolos and 
Waegelein, 1992; Yang et al., 2010). However, Swanstrom et al. (2006) diverge from 
the consensus and find a negative relationship. 
Datta et al. (2001) and Yang et al. (2010) both find that high EBC is more effective in creating 
positive abnormal returns than low EBC. Datta et al.’s (2001) study 1,719 acquisitions in the period 
from 1993-1998, and we find their strong results with regards to sample size and consistency with 
previous articles. However, the testing was done in the time period leading up to the internet bubble 
which was characterized by explosive growth of stock option-based executive pay and an active 
market for corporate takeovers, which could exaggerate the results.  
Supporting the notion that EBC increase shareholder value, Bliss and Rosen (2001) find that CEOs 
with more stock-based compensation were less likely to make an acquisition, and conclude that the 
CEO is accordingly less likely to reduce shareholder wealth. The study considers bank mergers and 
finds that recent mergers generally do not improve relative operating performance or produce 
positive abnormal returns to acquiring bank shareholders, and therefore that refraining from an 
acquisition is the shareholder value maximizing strategy.   
Swanstrom (2006) is the only study that suggests that EBC has a negative relationship to abnormal 
returns, but when looking at the CEO wealth sensitivity, he finds a positive relationship to abnormal 
returns. This is supportive of the use of EBC in achieving positive abnormal returns as the 
sensitivity of CEO wealth to changes in stock price is related to the use of EBC. He finds the 
negative relationship between EBC and abnormal returns surprising and proposes that the change in 
tax law in 1993 (his sample was from 1994 through 1998) where salary and bonus deductibility got 
capped at 1 million dollar as an explanation for this result. Hence, the negative relationship does not 
seem to be generalizable to other periods of time.   
The problem of using EBC instead of considering stock options and stock ownership separately is 
clearly illustrated in Figure 3.3. Instead of the clear picture of stock options as positively related to 
abnormal returns, the results from the EBC research would give imprecise conclusions on the 
relationship of both stock options and stocks with abnormal returns. We will therefore not use EBC 
in our research, but rather use separate measures for stocks and stock options.  
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Figure 3.3:  Comparison of the incentive effect of EBC, stock ownership and stock options on abnormal 
returns. 
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3.1.4 Long-Term Incentive Plans increase Abnormal Returns through Long-Term 
Alignment of Goals 
Based on the research by Tehranian et al. (1987) and Travolos and Waegelein (1992), 
there does not seem to be a downside to implementing LTIP in the executive 
compensation. Accordingly, we believe that LTIP will be positively related to 
abnormal returns for acquisitions in Norway as well.  
Tehranian, Travolos and Waegelain (1987) investigate the relation between LTIP and merger related 
abnormal returns and find evidence that bidding firms with LTIP experience a significantly more 
favorable stock market reaction at the announcement of acquisition proposals relative to firms 
without these plans. They thereby show that LTIP contribute to alignment of interests between 
executives and shareholders. In light of the findings of Lewellen et al. (1985), the study looks at 
managers' stock ownership as a control variable, and the results hold even when controlling for this. 
Tehranian et al. (1987) propose that LTIP might be better suited to solve agency problems than 
short-term incentive structures as LTIP solve the horizon problem described by Jensen and Smith’s 
(1985).  
Travlos and Waegelein (1992) support the result that firms with LTIP experience significantly higher 
abnormal returns at the announcement of mergers. Based on a correlation test, they find that firms 
with lower percentages of managerial stock ownership adopt LTIP to better align the interests of 
stockholders and managers. This is consistent with Tehrainian et al.’s (1987) findings, but on further 
investigation they find that this does not hold when they look at the dollar value of stock ownership 
instead of percentages. As Travlos and Waegelein (1992) have not done a similar comparison, it is 
uncertain whether these results would also be insignificant if the percentage was replaced by the 
value of the stock holdings. It is apparent that LTIP are related to higher CAR, but as the form of 
LTIP vary greatly from one firm to another, we find it difficult to include specific information about 
LTIP in our research. We have therefore chosen to include LTIP as a control variable, rather than to 
develop specific hypotheses for this measure. 
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3.2 Impact of Bidding Executive Incentive Structures on Risk Taking and 
Diversification 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The collective research up to the present time point to three main factors that affect the risk taking 
of managers: stock ownership, stock option holdings and degree of monitoring by blockholders. We 
find that the two stock based incentive structures are more important from a shareholder point of 
view, as these two factors can be controlled by the board, while the presence of blockholders 
cannot. Blockholders is therefore more of a factor to take into consideration when deciding on the 
level to award of the other two forms of incentives. We also find that the collective research lacks 
studies that give concrete advice to shareholders on how to construct an optimal compensation plan.  
In Figure 3.4 we summarize the findings of the articles considered in this section of the literature 
review, separated into the three main incentive structures studied. In the following review we will 
look at the three main factors affecting risk taking separately to best assess the strengths and 
weaknesses of the research on each factor. Conclusively we will form a hypothesis for the 
relationship between each factor and risk taking in M&A for Norwegian firms.  
We find that the main weakness in the risk focused stream of research is that there are almost as 
many measures for risk used, as there are researchers. Most studies in the 20th century have used 
diversification as a measure for decrease in risk taking, while most studies in the 21st century studies 
risk taking directly. To further complicate the matter, there are countless methods for measuring 
diversification. One commonly used measure is to compare the SIC-codes of the bidder and the 
target to establish if they operate in the same area of business. This method has a severe weakness in 
that SIC-codes are not consistent in reporting the similarity of business areas. This means that the 
categorization of diversifying vs. non-diversifying acquisitions can be flawed.  
  
Figure 3.4: Summarized results from the collective research on the relationship between CEO incentive 
structures and risk taking. 
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3.2.1 Stock Ownership is Non-Linearly related to CEO Risk Taking 
In the research concerning the relationship between stock ownership and risk taking 
in M&A, Figure 3.4 shows us that there is an almost even number of articles that find 
a negative relationship (May, 1995; Shekar and Torbey, 1995; Sanders, 2001; 
Sudarsanam & Huang, 2006) and that find a positive relationship (Agrawal and 
Mandelker, 1987; Saunders et al., 1990; Denis et al. (1997). Additionally there are two 
articles that do not find the variables to be significantly correlated (Lewellen et al., 1989; Servaes, 
1996).  
Within the branch that argues for a negative relationship May (1995) studies managers’ desire for 
pursuing risk reduction and finds a significant negative relation between the ratio of CEO wealth 
vested in the firm and the level of risk taking sought in an acquisition. This is in line with the 
reasoning that CEOs with more non-diversifiable wealth in the firm will have stronger incentives to 
reduce firm risk. While this is in opposition to the conclusions drawn by Agrawal and Mandelker 
(1987), who find a significant positive relationship between the security holdings of managers and 
risk increasing acquisition decisions, the divergence can probably be partly explained by the different 
measures for CEO wealth vested in the firm used by the two studies. While Agrawal and Mandelker 
(1987) look at the ratio of equity holdings to total annual compensation, May (1995) studies the ratio 
of equity holdings to a proxy for the lifetime cash compensation accumulated by the CEO. This 
difference means that the same CEO will appear to have a larger ratio of her wealth in firm equity in 
the first study than in the latter. We believe this to be indicative of a relationship where managerial 
stock holdings increase risk-taking behavior if the ratio of CEO wealth vested in the firm is low, but 
decrease it when the ratio is high. This relationship would be in line with agency theory’s prediction 
of two opposing effects of stock ownership on risk; increased diversification and value 
maximization. In light of this theoretical prediction, the divergent results from this stream of 
research can be interpreted as a result of a tradeoff made by the CEO. Our conjecture is thus that 
the effect of stock ownership on CEO risk taking is non-linear and dependent on the level of 
diversification of her wealth. 
The other studies in this stream of research do not consider the effect of the ratio of CEO wealth 
invested in the firm, and thus give no further insight as to the level of diversification of the CEOs’ 
personal wealth portfolio and their desire to diversify their portfolios. The relationship we outline in 
the previous paragraph is therefore neither strengthened nor weakened by these studies. However, 
Servaes (1996) show that the relationship between stock ownership and diversification varies with 
the diversification trends at the time. He finds that managers who have a high level of ownership are 
found to diversify only in the 1960’s when diversification was not associated with a loss to the 
shareholders, while managers who do not have ownership in the firm will do so even in the 1970’s 
when there was a shareholder cost. Lewellen, Loderer and Rosenfeld (1989) on the other hand find 
that stockholdings of managers have an almost insignificant impact on intensifying risk reducing 
mergers and that most mergers are risk increasing.  
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Based on the theoretical prediction in agency theory mentioned above and the conflicting results of 
previous studies, we reason that a non-linear relationship will most likely be the best explanation for 
the relationship between stock ownership and risk taking. This reasoning is further strengthened by 
the results of Wright et al. (2002), who find a non-linear relationship between stock ownership and 
risk taking in M&A. Our hypothesis is thus:  
Hypothesis 2a: The relationship between CEO stock ownership and risk taking resulting from an acquisition decision 
will be positive non-linear 
3.2.2 Stock Options increase CEO Risk Taking 
The relationship between stock options and risk taking in M&A is unanimously 
found to be positive in the research considered (Sanders, 2001; Sanders & Hambrick, 
2007; Sudarsanam & Huang, 2006). Focusing on the risk asymmetry between stock 
options and stock ownership of CEOs, Sanders (2001) finds a positive association 
between CEO stock option pay and firm acquisition activity, as opposed to the 
negative relation he finds for stock ownership. Sanders and Hambrick (2007) support the conclusion 
of a positive relation between stock option pay and firm acquisition activity. They also conclude that 
the high-variance investments undertaken by the firms with stock option pay, lead to more extreme 
gains and losses for them than for their competitors. The most controversial finding of Sanders and 
Hambrick (2007) is that the losses are generally larger than the gains, resulting in a net loss of the 
stock option policy. However, the authors do not conclude that stock options should be avoided; 
rather they advise that it should be used in moderation (20-50% of total CEO compensation) as this 
level is shown to increase risk taking without inducing big losses.  
Sudarsanam and Huang (2006) find results that support Sanders’ (2001) conclusion on both stock 
ownership and stock option pay. Their study focuses on two measures of managerial incentives: the 
sensitivity of the managers’ wealth to stock return volatility (Vega) and the sensitivity of managers’ 
wealth to stock price change (Delta). While increase in Vega is associated with increase in firm risk, 
increase in Delta is associated with a decrease in firm risk. With the additional information that 
restricted stock grants are solely related to Delta, while stock option compensation is related to both 
Delta and Vega, this shows that stock option compensation increases risk taking behavior more than 
stock grants. 
 
Even though the risk increasing effect of stock options can be useful to counter a CEO’s risk averse 
behavior, both Sanders (2001) and Sanders and Hambrick (2007) point out that the CEOs risk 
taking can easily become excessive, leading to decreased shareholder returns. It is therefore 
important to moderate the level of stock option compensation.  
 
We can see from our analysis of the existing research that the relationship between stock options 
and risk taking is more clear-cut than the relationship between stock ownership and risk taking. This 
is also in line with the prediction in agency theory and the findings in abnormal returns. However, 
looking at the valuation formula for options by Black and Scholes (1973) it is clear that the option 
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value’s sensitivity to changes in volatility changes with the price of the underlying asset. As we can 
see in Figure 3.5, the risk sensitivity of the option price is at its peak right when the asset price is just 
below the strike price. As the asset prices drops below or rises above the strike price, the option 
price sensitivity to risk decreases.  
 
Figure 3.5: The relationship between asset price and the option price sensitivity to risk (δc/δς) as given by the 
Black-Scholes Pricing Model. 
If we assume that a typical CEO has a utility function that is proportional to the total value of the 
stock options she holds, the changing option price sensitivity means that for two CEOs holding the 
same monetary value of stock options, the CEO whose underlying asset is closest to the option 
strike price, will have the strongest risk increasing incentives. This relationship is illustrated in Figure 
3.6.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.6: The relationship between the volatility of the underlying asset and utility of holding options. 
As a consequence of the unequal strength of the risk increasing incentive of options, we find that 
the relationship between the value of stock options held and the risk change in a transaction is 
unlikely to be strictly linear, even though this seems to be the consensus in most of the previous 
research. As we cannot find a plausible suggestion for the type of relationship between the stock 
options held and the risk taken, we will use an open hypothesis and rely on our data to find the most 
likely relationship between the variables.  
Hypothesis 2b: The relationship between CEO stock options and risk taking resulting from an acquisition 
decision will be positive 
0
500
1000
1500
5600 5800 6000 6200 6400 6600 6800
δc/δσ 
Asset Price 
THE OPTION PRICE SENSITIVITY TO RISK IS STRONGEST FOR  
AT-THE-MONEY OPTIONS 
Strike Price 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5
CEO Utility 
Volatility 
CEOS WITH CLOSE-TO-THE-MONEY OPTIONS HAVE STRONGER 
RISK INCREASING INCENTIVES 
Close-to-the-money CEO
Far-from-the-money CEO
28 
 
3.2.3 The Presence of Blockholders has a Monitoring Effect on CEO Risk Taking 
As seen in Figure 3.4, the majority of the research that find a relationship between the 
presence of blockholders and risk taking in M&A, establishes a positive correlation 
(Amihud & Lev, 1981; Lloyd et al., 1987; Denis et al., 1997). However, there are 
researchers that claim the opposite and argue for a negative relationship (Andersen et 
al., 2000) and others again that report that there is no relationship between the 
variables (Lane et al., 1998 and Shekar and Torbey, 2005).  
A widely cited study by Amihud and Lev (1981) sets the benchmark for other studies on the 
relationship between blockholders and risk taking in M&A. They find the presence of large 
blockholders to be a limiting factor for the diversification of managers, and interpret the results to 
mean that blockholders constrain the CEOs ability to pursue their private agenda of risk reduction. 
They find significant support for their hypothesis that managers in owner-controlled firms will 
engage in less risk reducing activities, such as conglomerate mergers, than managers in manager-
controlled firms2. Lloyd et al. (1987) confirm Amihud and Lev’s (1981) conclusion that large 
blockholders have a monitoring effect on managers’ risk reduction activity, using a similar sample 
and method. These two studies thus argue for a significant positive relationship between 
blockholders and risk taking.  
Amihud and Lev (1981) was sharply criticized by Lane, Cannella and Lubatkin (1998) for the use of 
agency theory to make predictions about managers’ choice of diversification strategies. The 
disagreement between the two camps is basically one of method, as Lane et al. (1998) are able to 
reproduce the findings of the research they attack when using the methods of Amidud and Lev 
(1981). However, when they use strategic management theory3, as opposed to the financial 
economics perspective offered by agency theory, Lane et al. (1998) find that ownership structure will 
have little or no association with corporate diversification strategy. As it is clear that the method 
used will affect the results, we find that Lane et al.’s (1998) criticism draw attention to the fact that 
this is a field that requires a broader perspective to be completely understood. 
Research by Denis, Denis and Sarin (1997), Anderson et al. (2000) and Shekar and Torbey (2005) 
provide us with a broader perspective by considering several factors, as opposed to a selective focus 
on ownership structure, in the analysis on risk taking in M&A. The three studies all agree that equity 
based incentives is a factor worth considering in addition to ownership structure.  
Denis et al. (1997) provide confirmation of the positive relationship found by Amihud and Lev 
(1981) and Lloyd et al. (1987). The additional contribution of this study is that it separates the 
monitoring effect of large blockholders from the incentive effect of the stockholdings of the 
                                                 
2 Manager-controlled here refers to firms where no stockholder owns more than 10% of the total shares; owner-
controlled firms have single stockholders with more than 30% of the shares while weak owner control applies to firms 
where the largest stockholder holds 10-30% of the total shares. There is no differentiation made between managers, 
directors or outside shareholders.  
3 Lane et al. (1998) point out that strategic management theory has the difference among individual firms as it’s area of 
focus, while financial economists dismiss this field with simplifying assumptions. 
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manager and thereby provides a more detailed view of the effects involved. The authors find both 
factors to be positively correlated to risk taking. These results differ from Shekar and Torbey’s 
(2005) conclusions of a significant negative relationship between managers’ shareholdings and risk 
taking, and no significant relationship of blockholders on risk taking. These differences are likely to 
be explained by the fact that the latter study uses a sample of Australian firms, while all other 
research is based on US firms. Board size is one example of a governance structure that is different 
in the two countries. In Australia the average board size is 9, versus an average of 12 in the US 
(Baxt, Ramsay and Stapledon, 2002). There is evidence for smaller boards having a stronger 
monitoring effect than larger (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2000). This can imply that, as a small board 
is already strong, the extra monitoring effect of blockholders on a smaller board can be less 
significant than on a larger board. The smaller board size in Australia can therefore be an 
explanation for the lack of relationship between blockholders and diversification in Shekar and 
Torbey’s (2005) study. The divergence with respect to managerial ownership is not surprising given 
the results we found in the section dedicated to this field of research.  
Anderson, Bates, Bizjak and Lemmon (2000) are in opposition to the previously discussed studies in 
that they find a negative relation between blockholders and risk taking. They argue that several 
factors need to be considered to understand the difference between diversifying and non-
diversifying firms and find that diversified firms use more outside directors (blockholders) and have 
higher rates of management turnover, while firms that decrease their level of diversification have 
higher equity based compensation and lower insider ownership. In relation to these results it is 
worth noting that in their sample they find that equity-based pay constitutes an average of 46.7% 
and median 54.3% of total compensation. Due to the explosion in use of stock options in the 1980s, 
this is likely to be significantly higher than in the firms in the samples in the 1960’s and 70’s 
(Amihud & Lev (1981); Lloyd et al. (1987)) and can therefore provide a timeline explanation for why 
performance pay now seems like an important indicator for risk taking in addition to ownership 
structure.  
We can conclude that the majority of research finds that the presence of blockholders to be a factor 
that is positively associated with risk taking. However, this effect was primarily studied in the 
diversification era of M&A during the 1960’s and 1970’s, while later studies have turned their 
attention to stock based incentives. As it appears that the presence of blockholders has become a 
less important factor influencing CEO risk taking in later years, we do not consider it as important 
as the stock based incentives. Additionally, the presence of blockholders is not something which the 
board can decide to have or not, and is therefore not possible to use as a tool for risk management. 
Nevertheless, the presence of blockholders is likely to influence the risk taking of the CEO and as 
risk taking and return is closely linked, it is likely to influence return as well. As this is a variable that 
shareholders cannot control, we will include it as a control variable rather than forming a specific 
hypothesis. 
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4 Methodology 
4.1 The Event Study Approach 
The event study has become the standard method in finance for measuring security price reaction to 
an announcement or event (Binder, 1998) and we will use this method both to measure the risk 
change and the abnormal returns stemming from a merger. MacKinlay (1997) presents a review and 
summary of the event study method where he presents the method divided into eight steps as 
presented in Figure 4.1. The different steps and specifications are discussed below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The first step is to define the event of interest. In this study the event will be the 
announcement dates of the M&A in our sample.  
The second step is to identify the period over which the security prices will be examined (T1 
to T2), defined as the event window (Figure 4.2). Two factors are important when choosing 
an event window. Firstly, the length of the window must be long enough to capture the 
market reaction, but short enough to minimize the effects of unrelated news on the share 
price. Secondly, the period over which the event is measured should not overlap with the 
estimation window for normal returns. To establish a point of reference for choosing the 
event window, we analyzed the event windows used in the studies considered in the 
literature review. The findings of this analysis are illustrated in Figure 4.3. Based on this 
analysis, we have chosen an event window that begins prior to the announcement date, to 
ensure that we capture the effect of any leakages, and that considers an equal number of days 
after the announcement. Initially, we chose the number of days for our event window based 
on an average of the studies we have reviewed (4 days prior the event to 4 days past the 
event), and then we adjusted it through trial and error to find the window with the strongest 
1 
2 
Event T0 T1 T2 T3 
Figure 4.2: The Event Periods T0-T3. 
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Figure 4.1: The eight steps in an event study. 
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results. Our final event window for CAR is the period 15 days prior to the event through 15 
days past the event.  
 
 
Figure 4.3: Overview of event windows from reviewed literature. 
Next we will determine the selection criteria for the inclusion of a given firm in the study. 
This is described in detail in Section 5.  
To be able to calculate CAR and volatility, it is necessary to model the normal performance. 
We have used the market model for this purpose  
   
where rij  is the return of firm j for day i and rmi is the return of the Oslo Benchmark Index 
(OBX) for day i. To ensure consistency, we will use the same market index and βj in the 
CAR calculations and the estimation of firm specific variance. Through the marked model 
we separate the portion of the daily return that can be explained from market returns (αj + 
βjrmi) from the firm-specific return εij.  
We will use the pre- and post-event windows to estimate the normal performance of each 
firm’s stock. For the pre-event estimation window, we choose the period stretching from 
150 to 50 days prior to the announcement date, and for the post-event estimation window 
we chose the period stretching from 50 to 150 days after the event. This window is chosen 
so that we will be far enough away from the actual event to avoid including the event-
specific increase in return or volatility. We also wanted to ensure that we did not include 
periods that were too distant from the event to avoid other unpredictable disturbances. We 
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use the pre-event estimation window to calculate estimated values for α and β, which we 
then use to calculate our firm-specific returns.  
To find the CAR of the event, we use the firm-specific return, εij. The CAR is the sum of the 
firm-specific return terms over the event window.  
      
 
To find an estimate for the change in firm specific risk we will estimate the annualized firm-
specific volatility in the post-event window, and compare this to the annualized volatility in 
the post-event window. For n trading periods, 100 days, with firm-specific returns εjt-1, …., 
εjt-n, whose average is ,  we will use the formula for realized volatility to calculate the sample 
standard deviation 
 
as an estimate for the standard deviation for the firm-specific return for firm j in the trading 
period considered. The annualized firm-specific volatility can be computed as where N 
denotes the number of trading periods in one year (Taylor, 2007) and is defined here as 252 
days.  
Further, we designed the testing framework for our hypotheses. We have constructed a 
multivariate regression model and tested it in the data analysis and statistical package 
framework, STATA. The first testing was done on the complete sample of 72 transactions, 
but we have also tested subsamples of the dataset. The sub-samples were divided into firms 
with stock option, firms with stock ownership, firms with both stock ownership and stock 
options and firms that do not have either. Stepwise regression was used to eliminate 
variables that had no significant impact on the dependent variables. Details of the regression 
is discussed in Section 4.3.  
The last two steps consist of presenting the empirical results and diagnostics, and to analyze 
competing explanations. This will be discussed further in Section 6 and 7 where we present 
our results and analyze the findings.  
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4.2 Hypothesis Testing  
4.2.1 Definition of Variables 
Dependent Variables 
Our dependent variables are the change in risk and return as a consequence of the merger deal. Both 
changes will be measured using the previously described event study methodology. As a proxy for 
the change in risk, we will use the difference between the annualized volatility of the stock before 
the merger and the annualized volatility of the stock after the merger. In addition we will look at the 
squared difference to capture the absolute change in risk and not just the direction. We also tested a 
ratio measure for risk, calculated as the ratio of the post-event volatility to the pre-event volatility, 
but as this gave insignificant results in the regression analysis, we have excluded it from further 
analysis. As a proxy for the abnormal return of the acquisition we will use the CAR-value measured 
on our chosen event window (+15, -15 days).  
CARi:  Sum of abnormal returns for firm i over the event window. 
Voli: Difference between the volatility over the post-event estimation window and the 
volatility over the pre-event estimation window for firm i. 
VolSquaredi: Squared difference between the volatility over the post-event estimation 
window and the volatility over the pre-event estimation window for firm i. 
Independent Variables  
We have chosen to look at the different elements of the CEO incentive structure as our independent 
variables. Our review of the existent literature has made it clear that stock ownership and stock 
option holdings are the two most important factors that influence risk taking and abnormal returns 
in M&A. As previously argued, we will look at the two types of stock based incentives separately. 
We will not differentiate between stocks that are granted and stocks that the CEO has purchased 
himself. May (1995) suggests that the ratio of the stock based compensation to the total 
compensation is more important as a determinant for successful M&A than the value of the stock 
based incentives themselves. We will therefore consider both a measure of the ratio to CEO total 
compensation and a value measure for stock ownership and stock option holdings measured in 
NOK. The total compensation includes pensions, bonus and other remuneration, but does not 
include stock based pay.  Additionally, as we expect a non-linear relationship to provide the best 
explanation for the relationship between stock ownership and risk taking and abnormal returns, we 
will include the square of both the ratio and value of stock ownership. We will also include a squared 
measure for the stock option holdings, as our theoretical reasoning has shown that this relationship 
can be non-linear as well. The list of our independent variables is as follows:  
VoSi: The total value of the own company stocks owned or controlled by the CEO of 
company i. 
RoSi: The ratio of stocks owned or controlled by the CEO of company i to her total 
compensation.  
VoSOi: The total value of the stock options held by the CEO of company i. 
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RoSOi: The ratio of stock options held by the CEO of company i to her total 
compensation. 
VoSi
2: The squared total value of the stocks owned or controlled by the CEO of 
company i. 
RoSi
2: The squared ratio of stocks owned or controlled by the CEO of company i to her 
total compensation.  
VoSOi
2: The squared total value of the stock options held by the CEO of company i. 
RoSOi
2: The squared ratio of stock options held by the CEO of company i to her total 
compensation.  
 
All values are taken from the end of year in the year of the M&A announcement and are 
measured in NOK. 
 
We have valued the stock ownership of the CEO based on the number of shares owned by the 
CEO listed in the annual report for the year of the acquisition. We have then used the end-of-year 
share price to calculate the value of the shares owned. The number of options held, the time to 
maturity and strike price were found in the annual reports. We have found the value of the options 
by use of the Black-Scholes model. When the risk free rate was not given we have used Norwegian 
Bonds with time to maturity of 10 years for the year of the announcement. We have used the end-
of-year share price as the input share price in the model and have assumed all options to be 
European. Volatility is measured as annual volatility for the year of the announcement, estimated 
from the pre-event window as described in Section 4.1.  
Control Variables  
Through our review of the literature, it has become clear that LTIP and the presence of 
blockholders are variables that will contribute to further insight into the relationship between stock-
based incentives and the return and risk change from an acquisition. However, difficulty of 
measuring for LTIP and difficulty of controlling the level of blockholders lead us to include them as 
control variables rather than independent variables.  We will measure the presence of blockholders 
by finding the average ownership percentage for the three largest shareholders. We have used the 
end-of-year ownership percentages listed in the annual reports. LTIP will be measured using a 
dummy variable, which is 1 if there is an incentive contract (stocks, options or bonuses) that has a 
perspective of at least 3 years at the time of the acquisition, and 0 otherwise. The information on 
incentive contracts are from in the annual reports. 
Additionally, the reviewed research suggests that firm size has an impact on acquisition outcomes 
and on compensation. There is widespread use of firm size as a control variable when studying the 
relationship between the two (Tehranian et al. 1987; Datta et al. 2001; Wright et al., 2002; Bliss and 
Rosen, 2001; Williams and Rao, 2006; Denis et al., 1997; Sanders & Hambrick, 2007; Sudarsanam 
and Huang, 2006). Bajaj and Vijh (1995) show that the market reaction to corporate announcements 
is larger for small firms since there is little information produced for such stocks during non-
announcement periods. Sudarsanam and Huang (2006) find it to affect investment levels and 
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performance. We will test for its impact by defining the size variable as the acquirer’s market 
capitalization on the day prior to the investment date as used in Datta et al. (2001). 
Although the method of payment for the deal has been a popular control variable in many of the 
reviewed articles, we have chosen not to include this in our regression model. Our decision is based 
on the finding that the method of payment (cash or stock) and the mode of acquisition (tender offer 
or merger) are not significantly related to the post-acquisition performance once the executive 
ownership and compensation structure of the acquirer has been accounted for (Datta et al., 2001). 
Accordingly, our control variables are:  
Sizei: The value of acquirer i’s market capitalization on the day preceding the 
announcement date. 
Blocki: The average percentage of ownership held by the three largest owners in firm i  
LTIPi: Dummy variable, 1 if firm i has LTIP, 0 if not.  
4.2.2 Regression Analysis 
As mentioned under the event study section, we have chosen to test the correlation between the 
variables above through a regression analysis, in line with the standard method in existent literature. 
We hypothesize that the relationship between the variables will not be purely linear, but rather 
polynomial, and that there will be more than one factor explaining the relationship between CEO 
compensation and the risk and return of an M&A transaction. We have therefore constructed 
multiple polynomial regression models to test our hypotheses. 
The regression models used are based on those used by Wright et al. (2002) in that we also expect a 
non-linear relationship between stock ownership and our risk and return measures. However, while 
the former use only the value of CEO Stock Ownership and Option Holdings, we have also included 
variables for the ratio of Stock Ownership and Option Holdings compared to the CEOs total 
compensation. Additionally we use a different set of control variables, as specified above. The 
variables for our regression models are listed in Table 4.1. 
We have used R2 as a measure for the explanatory power of the model. We have used an exploratory 
approach to find the model that best fit our data. The process we have used is stepwise regression, 
and we have thereby tried to find the model that gives the strongest combination of high R2 and low 
P-value for the entire regression model. 
Dependent Variables Independent and Control Variables 
CAR (-15 to +15 days) 
Difference of Variance of Returns 
Squared Difference of Variance of Returns 
Set 1: VoS, VoS2, VoSO, VoSO2, Block, Size, 
LTIP 
Set 2: RoS, RoS2, RoSO, RoSO2, Block, Size, LTIP 
 Table 4.1: Regression model variables. 
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To test our hypotheses we have used a standard t-test and rejected the null hypothesis for P-values 
higher than 0,1.  
Stepwise Regression Procedure 
We have designed a stepwise regression procedure to find the model with the best explanatory 
power, combined with high significance. These 7 steps can describe the procedure we have 
followed:  
For each dependent variable, perform two regression analyses, one for each set of 
independent and control variables. 
Select the set of variables that gives significant results (P < 0,1). 
Select the variables that are significant according to the results of the t-test ((P>|t|) < 0,1) 
from step 1. 
Perform new regression analyses, one for each set selected in step 2, only including the 
variables selected in step 3.  
Select the model with the best combination of high R2 and low P.  
Select the next variable with the lowest value of  P>|t|, and include it in the next regression. 
a. If the regression with the new variable gives higher R2 without the relationship of the 
model losing its significance (P > 0,1), keep the included variable and repeat step 6.  
b. If the regression with the new variable gives non-significant results (P > 0,1), reject 
the variable, and repeat step 6.  
When all the variables have been tested in step 6, we are left with the regression models that 
have the best combination of high R2 and low P-value for each dependent variable.  
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5 Data 
5.1 Sample Construction 
We have chosen to limit our sample to Norwegian acquirers to be able to capture the country 
specific effects that we expect to find in this market. We used the Dealogic database to produce a list 
of all acquisitions with Norwegian public acquirers and announcement date between 01.01.1999 and 
31.12.2009. The limitation to public acquirers was necessary to ensure that we would have access to 
the share price of the firms around the announcement date, so that we could calculate CAR and the 
estimated volatility. We limited ourselves to study the last 10 years because it would be difficult to 
obtain annual reports with compensation data for earlier years than 1999. Additionally, the M&A 
market in Norway was very limited before this period. We only included acquisitions where the 
acquired share of the target is larger than 50% and where the deal value was at least 5% of the 
acquirers’ market capitalization. We introduced the limitations for acquired share and ratio of market 
capitalization to ensure that we only included actual takeover bids and that the deals were large 
enough to affect the share price of the acquirer in a measurable way.  
80 M&A fitted our selection criteria from the Dealogic database. Of these, there were 75 firms for 
which we could find annual reports with satisfactory compensation data, and of these there were 68 
firms for which we found all the share price information we needed in the Factset database for share 
price information. These 68 firms have conducted 72 transactions and is hence our final sample. 
The sample sizes in comparable studies are decidedly larger, with an average of 440 observations. 
This is mainly because our sample is so limited due to our limitation of Norwegian bidder firms, and 
we could therefore not have increased our sample without including a larger geographic area. The 
limited sample size can affect the generalizability of our results.  
5.2 Sample Description  
5.2.1 Statistical Properties of Return Data 
The CAR values for all the bidders in our sample have an average value of 5,8%, which means that 
the overall outcome in our sample is that acquisitions give relatively high positive shareholder 
returns for bidder firms. Loughran and Vijn (1997) claim that acquiring shareholders earn negative 
abnormal returns from mergers, and according to an analysis by the Boston Consulting Group 
(2007) the average worldwide acquirer CAR is -1,2% for the period 1996-2006. Furthermore, we 
find that the average CAR for the studies considered in the literature review is -0,835%. Overall we 
see a negative trend for US bidder returns, which is in stark contrast to the high positive return that 
we have found in this Norwegian sample. Our median return of 0,86% is in line with the tendency 
for European acquisitions to give slightly positive returns to bidder firms. However, the average 
CAR in our sample is still substantially higher than the expectation for Europe.  
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As we can see in Figure 5.1, there are some very large positive outliers that cause the positive 
average. The maximum CAR in our sample, 82,3%, was for the acquisition by Altinex ASA of 
Denerco Oil A/S in 2006. This record-high CAR was closely followed by the returns from the 
acquisition by WiCom ASA of Photonyx Ltd in 2003 and by Pan Fish ASA of Marine Harvest 
International in 2006. We have not been able to identify a plausible reason for the high returns seen 
in the three high returns through analysis of possible outside factors that can have obscured the 
CAR values. We will therefore carefully consider the impact these transactions have on our 
regression analysis and consider to exclude them from the sample. Studying the sample we get when 
we exclude these three transactions, we observe a median CAR of 0,36% and a mean of 2,7%. These 
sample characteristics are closer to the findings in the literature review and the average worldwide 
CAR. 
The minimum CAR is -22,1%, and the sample is negatively skewed with the mass of the 
observations found in the positive top. We can also see that the standard deviation is relatively high, 
which indicates high variance about the mean. Furthermore, the analysis shows that “the 
peakedness” of the results, the kurtosis, is very high. Accordingly, most of the values are found to be 
around the median, which could imply that the values that look like outliers in the graph, in reality 
are nothing more than rarely occurring variance.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 CAR 
Median 0,86% 
Mean 5,78% 
StDev 19,0% 
Skew 2,196 
Kurtosis 6,220 
  
 
Figure 5.1: Distribution of CAR in the sample. 
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5.2.2 Statistical Properties of Volatility Data 
As seen in Figure 5.2, the mergers in our sample are risk decreasing with a negative mean for 
volatility difference. However, when considering the median of -0,065% we see that most of the 
transactions are risk decreasing and that the extreme negative outliers further reduce the negative 
average. The three outliers are the acquisitions by WiCom ASA of Photonyx Ltd in 2003, WiCom 
ASA of Smartnet AS in 2003 and Det Norske Oljeselskap AS of Aker Exploration ASA in 2009. 
When excluding these transactions we find a median of 0,84% and a mean of 2%. Hence, without 
these extreme outliers our sample can be viewed as generally risk increasing, and in correlation to 
our expectations of acquisitions increasing risk. We will therefore consider the effect of removing 
the three outliers on our regression results discussed in Section 6. We see that, as for the CAR 
values, we have a high kurtosis. However, the standard deviation is much higher and the skew is 
negative.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The volatility difference has a weakly positive correlation with CAR as seen in Figure 5.3. An 
example of this is that the extreme outliers for Volatility difference are not the same transactions as 
the extreme outliers for CAR, except for one transaction. The positive correlation is in line with the 
expectation for an efficient market.  
 Volatility 
difference 
Median -0,065% 
Mean -3,3% 
StDev 32,5% 
Skew -2,096 
Kurtosis 6,749 
  
 
Figure 5.2: Distribution of volatility difference in the sample. 
Figure 5.3: The correlation between CAR and volatility difference in the sample. 
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5.2.3 Control Variables and Sample Characteristics 
We have mentioned earlier that the size of the average firm in our sample is significantly smaller 
than the average S&P 500 firm. This is to be expected considering that the Norwegian market is very 
small compared to the US market, but we still believe that this is a factor that could influence our 
results.  
 
 
As seen in Figure 5.4, a few extreme firms have significantly higher market capitalization than the 
average. The sample has a span from the minimum value of 6,9 mNOK to the maximum of 371 041 
mNOK, the median is at 1 724 mNOK, while the average is almost ten times higher at 10 999 
mNOK. We also have an extremely high standard deviation of 47 517 mNOK. This distribution is 
typical for the Norwegian market where most firms are small, but with a few large international 
firms. The distribution does therefore not represent a bias when comparing with other samples of 
firms from the Norwegian market. However, the distribution is very different from an S&P 500 
sample of firms, and therefore represents a significant bias on comparison to US research.   
The average ownership level of the three largest shareholders is 12%. The firm with the largest 
blockholder ownership has 26,2%, whilst the smallest has 2,4%. The range of blockholder 
ownership is presented in Figure 5.5. As mentioned in Section 4.2.1, we estimated the presence of 
blockholders by taking the average of the three largest shareholders for each company. We have not 
differentiated between managers, directors or outside shareholders. Shareholder data were only 
available for 70 of 72 transactions in our sample; hence only 70 acquisitions are included in the 
control for this effect.  
0 100000 200000 300000 400000
mNOK 
Firm 
THE AVERAGE MARKET CAP IS DOMINATED BY A FEW 
EXTEMELY LARGE FIRMS 
Figure 5.4: The market capitalization (mNOK) of the firms in the sample. 
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36% of the firms in our sample have LTIP, which is the same level that was seen in the US. research 
in the 1970’s and 1980’s. The plans are mostly based on options or stocks with vesting periods of at 
least 3 years. Some firms also have three-year plans where performance requirements are set and 
rewarded if met. Firms that have defined long-term plans with shorter perspectives than 3 years have 
not been included in our definition of LTIP. We have included two firms due to a very large portion 
of stock ownership of 30% and 50%.  
 
The average CEO total compensations is 4,2 mNOK, and as we can see in Figure 5.6, there are 
some very high outliers in the dataset. The top two outliers have values of 7 times the average. 
However, as the compensation data are collected over the period from 1999 through 2009 it is 
natural that we find large variance in the nominal compensation value. The CEO’s compensation is 
measured as total compensation and includes salary, bonuses, pension and other benefits as free 
phone, car etc. Whenever the CEOs employment commenced during the year of the acquisition 
announcement, her total compensation has been scaled to project the annual compensation. 
 0 5 000 000 10 000 000 15 000 000 20 000 000 25 000 000 30 000 000 35 000 000
NOK 
Firm 
THE TOTAL COMPENSATION IS HEAVILY INFLUENCED BY 
A FEW EXTEME OUTLIERS AT THE TOP  
Figure 5.6: Overview of total compensation for CEOs in the sample. 
Figure 5.5: Overview of blockholder ownership and firms with LTIP in our sample. 
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The total value of stock ownership is three times that of stock options. This shows that use of 
options is not as widespread in Norway as in the US and this could represent a weakness in our 
analysis due to lack of data points. Firms that have CEOs with stock options make 32 transactions 
and firms where the CEO owns shares make 56 transactions in the period considered. Figure 5.7 
displays the distribution of stock options and stock ownership values. The average value for stock 
ownership is as high as 68 mNOK, while the average for stock options at 5,7 mNOK, less than a 
tenth of stock ownership.  
 
In the time period from 1999 to 2009 it is clear that both the number and the value of M&A 
transactions in Norway has increased. The data sample is hence more heavily weighted by the data 
from the last half of the period as seen in Figure 5.8. Our sample is from the fifth and sixth merger 
waves, which were dominated by more strategic and globalized deals. The globalized trend can also 
be seen in the explosion in the Norwegian M&A market, from a total deal value of 1,1 mUSD in 
1993 to a median value of 1 143 mUSD in the period 2003-2009. The latter period also included the 
record year 2006, where the Statoil-Hydro merger contributed to a total deal value of 34 838 mUSD.  
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2 OF 3 MERGERS IN THE SAMPLE ARE FROM THE YEARS 2005-2008 
Number of M&A
Value of M&A (kNOK)
0 500 000 000 1 000 000 000 1 500 000 000
NOK 
Firm 
THE TOTAL VALUE OF STOCK OWNERSHIP IS THREE TIMES 
THAT OF STOCK OPTIONS 
Stock option value
Sock ownership value
Figure 5.7: Distribution of stock ownership and stock options in the sample. 
Figure 5.8: Overview of number of transactions through our ten-year sample period. 
billion USD) 
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6 The impact of  stock based compensation 
on risk and return from M&A 
The results from the regression analysis offer several surprises in that none of the hypotheses we 
have formed based on US research can be confirmed when tested on this sample of Norwegian 
firms. Although we expected some cultural differences to influence our results, this is still a 
surprising result. Figure 6.1 displays a summary of our findings from the full sample when we have 
excluded the three extreme outliers for CAR and volatility difference. Our analysis shows that stock 
option is the only variable for which we can establish a significant relationship to CAR and we see 
that the relationship is negative. In the US literature there is a firmly established positive relationship 
between stock options and both CAR and volatility change. We therefore interpret this discrepancy 
as a sign of substantial differences between the two countries. To our surprise, we do not find any 
relationship between stock ownership and risk and return. However, we see a negative trend for 
both. The control variables, size, blockholders and LTIP are all found to have an insignificant 
impact on CAR and volatility in the full sample analysis, but we find trends that both support and 
reject our expectations for these variables. The results from the full sample analysis are summarized 
in the figure below and the findings will be analyzed further in this section. We will also discuss 
findings from the sub-sample analyses.  
  
Negative Not Significant 
CAR* 
VOLATILITY 
DIFFERENCE** 
VOLATILITY 
DIFFERENCE2**  
Negative Significant 1% Negative Not Significant Negative Not Significant STOCK OPTIONS 
Positive Not Significant Positive Not Significant Negative Not Significant STOCK OPTIONS2 
Negative Not Significant Negative Not Significant Positive Not Significant STOCK OWNERSHIP 
Positive Not Significant Positive Not Significant STOCK OWNERSHIP2 
Negative Not Significant Positive Not Significant Positive Not Significant SIZE 
Positive Not Significant Positive Not Significant Positive Not Significant BLOCKHOLDERS 
Negative Not Significant Negative Not Significant Negative Not Significant LTIP 
Figure 6.1: Summarized results of the regression analyses for the full sample.  
* based on sample excluding the three CAR outliers **based on sample excluding the three volatility outliers 
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6.1 Factors Affecting Return from M&A Decisions 
Our analysis shows that our model for prediction of CAR for bidder firms in M&A based on CEO 
incentives has R2 = 0,15 and P = 0,19. We can therefore not reject the null hypothesis of no 
relationship between stock based incentives and CAR. Table 6.1 presents the details of the 
regression results. Even though there are no significant relationships found in this model, we have 
found that stepwise regression leads us to a model with fewer variables that can confirm that there is 
a negative significant relationship between stock option ratio and CAR. We will discuss this 
relationship further in Section 6.1.2.   
We have performed the analysis on a sample where we have excluded the three transactions that 
have the highest CAR values. As mentioned in the Section 5.2.1, the extreme CARs observed in the 
event windows seemingly cannot be explained by the transactions, and regression analysis has shown 
that they have a distorting impact on the relationships found in the regression model. When we 
include the outlier transactions, our regression analysis indicates a significant positive non-linear 
relationship between CEO stock ownership and CAR. However, as these results are not robust 
when we exclude the outliers, we cannot weight them in our further analysis. The results of the 
regressions on the sample including the outlier transactions are found in Appendix D.  
6.1.1 Stock Ownership  
The regression results in Table 6.1 show that there is no significant relationship between CEO stock 
ownership and the abnormal return from an acquisition. As mentioned, we do find a positive non-
linear relationship between the variables when the three outlier transactions are included, but as we 
can see in Figure 6.2 a few extreme data points heavily influence the regression. When we exclude 
the three outlier firms, the regression results are dramatically changed, and we find the insignificant 
relationship we see in Table 6.1. The fact that the regression in Figure 6.2 is not robust to exclusion 
of outliers, means that we have to reject these results. While our dataset spans the entire range seen 
in the graph, with stock ownership ratios from a minimum of 0 to a maximum of 583, the vast 
majority of the data is on the lower end of the scale, with the median ownership ratio as low as 0,80.  
The insignificant results are not strong enough for us to reject our hypothesis (1a) that the 
relationship between CEO stock ownership and abnormal returns resulting from an acquisition 
announcement will be positive for low levels of stock ownership and negative for high levels of 
CAR Coefficient P>|t| R2 P 
   0,1456 0,1898 
MCap -4,59e-07 0,148   
Stock Option Ratio -0,0151 0,303   
Stock Option Ratio2 0,000291 0,806   
Stock Ownership Ratio -0,000486 0,328   
Stock Ownership Ratio2 7,36e-07 0,475   
Blockholders 0,0652 0,787   
LTIP -0,0192 0,544   
Constant 0,0569 0,119   
 
Table 6.1: Results from the regression analysis on CAR (full sample, excluding the three CAR outliers). 
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stock ownership. We can only conclude that we find no statistically significant relationship for the 
Norwegian market. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.1.2 Stock Options 
Surprisingly, we find stock option ratio to have a significant negative linear relationship to CAR. 
While our first regression model did not produce a significant negative coefficient for the 
relationship between stock options and CAR, we found stronger results through stepwise regression. 
By eliminating variables with low significance, we found that the model  
CAR = a + RoSOi(b1) + RoSi(b2) + RoSi
2(b3) 
had R2 = 0,15 and P = 0,01. The coefficient for stock option ratio is -0,174 (P>|t|=0,061) and the 
relationship between stock option ratio and CAR is illustrated in Figure 6.3. This finding is robust 
even if we remove the outlier CAR transactions. As we can see in the figure, the sample values for 
stock option ratio only spans from 0 to 15,2. The majority is at the lower end of the scale with a 3rd 
quartile ratio as low as 1,1. The relationship to CAR is strictly decreasing and robust and we 
therefore conclude that stock options will contribute to decreased returns in M&A.  
Based on existing research on incentive mechanisms in M&A we hypothesized (1b) that the 
relationship between CEO stock option holdings and abnormal returns resulting from an acquisition 
announcement would be linear and positive. Our analysis rejects this hypothesis and we deduce that, 
as our hypothesis was based on US research, the opposing results can suggest that there are 
substantial cultural and market differences between the two geographical areas.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.3: The relationship between stock option ratio and CAR. 
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Figure 6.2: The relationship between Stock Ownership Ratio and CAR. 
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6.1.3 Size, Blockholders and LTIP 
Neither of the control variables we have tested have a significant impact on the return of an M&A 
transaction. However, looking at the coefficients from the regression analysis we can see that there is 
a tendency for size and LTIP in the bidder firm to be negatively related to the CAR of the 
transaction, while the presence of blockholders is positively related.  
We find size of the firm to not influence the return of the transaction in any meaningful way. As 
previous research has shown, stock based incentives provide stronger incentives than the 
moderating effect of blockholders. Hence, we are not surprised to find that the level blockholders is 
not significant. For LTIP, on the other hand, we had expected a clearer relationship to CAR. The 
negative trend is in opposition to what we expected, and we find that LTIP does not appear to 
reduce agency problems. This is in line with the results for stock ownership and stock options, 
which also have surprised us with their negative correlations to CAR. However, the unexpected 
results can also be a consequence of the difficulty of measuring the LTIP. As mentioned in Section 
4.2.1, we used a dummy variable to measure the effect of the plan, and the low level of detail of this 
measure can have obscured the results.  
6.1.4 Sub-sample Analysis 
When testing the regression model on the sub-sample of firms that have CEOs with stock 
ownership (53 transactions), we can confirm the negative significant relationship between CAR and 
stock options. In addition, we find a significant negative relationship between CAR and firm size. 
This is in line with our expectations of larger market reaction for smaller firms. Through stepwise 
regression we find that the strongest regression model for this sub-sample is the one that includes 
the following variables: 
CAR = a + RoSi (b1) + RoSi
2(b2) + RoSO (b3)+ Sizei (b4) 
The regression model has R2 = 0,21 and P = 0,0216. The stock ownership variables are not 
significant in the regression. The coefficient for the stock option ratio is -0,01483 (P>|t|=0,007) 
and for size it is -5,27e-7 (P>|t|=0,093).  
The negative significant relationship between stock option ratio and CAR is confirmed for firms 
rewarding stock options (32 transactions). Size is not found to be significant for this sub-sample, but 
we see the same negative trend.  
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6.2 Factors Affecting Risk Change as a Consequence of M&A Decisions 
To study the effect of stock based incentives on the risk change of an acquisition we have used the 
volatility difference (post-acquisition volatility – pre-acquisitions volatility) to study the direction of 
the change, and the squared volatility difference to study the magnitude of the change. The results of 
the two regression analyses can be seen in Table 6.2 and Table 6.3. Both regressions show that we 
cannot reject the null hypothesis of no relationship between stock-based incentives and risk change. 
We see some trends in the regression results that we will discuss below, but as we can see the 
explanatory power of the model is extremely low, and the model is not statistically significant.  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As for the regression analysis on the relationship between incentive structures and CAR, we based 
the analysis on a sample where we excluded the transactions that had the most extreme values for 
the dependent variable. We saw in Section 5.2.2, that the three transactions with the lowest volatility 
differences appear to be outliers, and this suspicion is confirmed by the regression analyses we have 
done in this section. We will see in Section 6.2.1 that the three transactions have a distorting impact 
on the relationships found in the regression analyses. When we include the outlier transactions, our 
regression analyses indicates a significant negative non-linear relationship between CEO stock 
ownership and volatility difference and a significant negative relationship between stock ownership 
and squared volatility difference. However, as these results are not robust when we exclude the 
outliers, we cannot weight them in our further analysis. The results of the regressions on the sample 
including the outlier transactions are found in Appendix D.   
Volatility Difference Coefficient P>|t| R2 P 
   0,0553 0,8237 
MCap 2,12e-07 0,702   
Stock Option Ratio -0,00424 0,868   
Stock Option Ratio2 0,0000145 0,994   
Stock Ownership Ratio -0,000811 0,349   
Stock Ownership Ratio2 1,36e-06 0,444   
Blockholders 0,331 0,438   
LTIP -0,0430 0,436   
Constant 0,0108 0,864   
 
Table 6.2: Results from regression analysis on volatility difference (full sample, excluding outlier values for 
volatility difference). 
Volatility Difference2 Coefficient P>|t| R2 P 
   0,0449 0,8929 
MCap 2,10e-09 0,990   
Stock Option Ratio -0,000173 0,982   
Stock Option Ratio2 -0,000112 0,855   
Stock Ownership Ratio 0,000155 0,539   
Stock Ownership Ratio2 -6,34e-06 0,393   
Blockholders 0,00219 0,466   
LTIP -0,0849 0,228   
Constant 0,0814 0,208   
 
Table 6.3: Results from regression analysis on volatility difference2 (full sample, excluding outlier values for 
volatility difference). 
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6.2.1 Stock Ownership  
We see in Table 6.2 and 6.3 that CEO stock ownership has no significant impact on either the 
direction or the magnitude of volatility change around an acquisition. This is in line with the finding 
of no relationship between stock ownership and CAR.  
When we include the outlier transactions, regression analysis gives us the significant non-linear 
relationships we see in Figure 6.4 and 6.5. Again we see that the results are heavily influenced by a 
few outlier transactions, and we discover that when we remove the outliers, the relationships we 
found disappear completely. Therefore, we have to discard these results and rather build our further 
discussion upon the non-significant relationships we see in Table 6.2 and 6.3. The need to reject 
results because of lack of robustness is a further parallel to the relationship we have seen between 
stock ownership and CAR. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The non-significant relationship between stock ownership and risk taking is not a strong enough 
result for us to reject our hypothesis (2a) that the relationship between CEO stock ownership and 
risk taking resulting from an acquisition decision will be positive non-linear. Instead we can conclude 
that we find no significant relationship between CEO stock ownership and risk taking.  
Figure 6.4: The relationship between stock ownership ratio and volatility difference (full sample). 
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Figure 6.5: The relationship between stock ownership ratio and squared volatility difference (full sample). 
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6.2.2 Stock Options 
We find no statistical support for a relationship between CEO stock options and risk taking and we 
cannot reject the null hypothesis of no relationship. There is a weak negative correlation between 
stock options and volatility difference. This is in contradiction to the relationship we expected to 
find and to the general expectation in agency theory. However, as we expect that risk and return are 
positively correlated, the negative relationship to risk change is consistent with the significant 
negative relationship we found between stock options and return.  
The results are not strong enough to reject our hypothesis (2b) of a positive relationship between 
risk and CEO stock ownership, but we cannot confirm it either.  
6.2.3 Size, Blockholders and LTIP 
The regression model for the full sample shows that none of the control variables have significant 
impacts on risk change in M&A. For size and blockholders, we find weak trends of a positive 
relationship to risk taking, but for LTIP the relationship is negative. A positive relationship between 
blockholders and risk taking would be in line with the consensus in the US literature; however we 
cannot establish that there is such a relationship from the full sample analysis. We find that, in line 
with our expectation, the presence of blockholders seems to be less important than stock based 
incentives. LTIP negative correlation with volatility difference is in opposition to our belief that they 
can contribute to align the interests of the CEO and the shareholders. We cannot establish that 
there is a relationship between size and risk, but the results show that there is a tendency that larger 
firms take larger risks. We initially believed that the market reaction to corporate announcements 
would be larger for small firms since there is little information produced for such stocks during non-
announcement periods. The tendency in the data is in opposition to this effect, as we see a negative 
correlation between size and squared magnitude of the risk change (squared volatility difference).  
6.2.4 Sub-sample Analysis 
The most interesting results from the sub-sample analysis are found for firms with stock options (32 
transactions where 30 transactions also include stock ownership).  The negative trend for stock 
ownership and risk found for the full sample is strengthened with a significant relationship for this 
sub-sample. Through stepwise regression, we find that a regression model on the form 
Difference of Variance of Returns = a + Size(b1) + RoS(b2) + e 
 
gives the strongest results for this sub-sample, with R2 = 0,23, P= 0,023 and a positive significant 
coefficient for the size variable of 2,72e-06 (P>|t|=0,047). The negative significant coefficient for 
stock ownership ratio is -0,00165 (P>|t|=0,066). The positive relationship between size and risk is 
in accordance with the positive trend we see for the full sample, but as the result is stronger we can 
reject the null hypothesis of no relationship for this sub-sample. We can therefore conclude that for 
firms where the CEO has stock options, larger firms take higher risks in their investment decisions.  
The negative significant result between risk and stock ownership shows that stock ownership is 
connected to reduced risk for firms with stock options. According to agency theory, stock based 
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incentive mechanisms should help align the interests between shareholders and CEOs through the 
risk increasing properties of the incentives. As we see that stock ownership has a risk decreasing 
property, it is not a suitable incentive mechanism for reducing agency problems. 
For the same sub-sample of option rewarding firms, we see that high ownership levels of 
blockholders are positively tied to the magnitude of the volatility change in a significant way. Again 
stepwise regression gives us the model with the strongest results. Surprisingly, blockholders is the 
only variable that is significantly related to the squared volatility difference in this sample and we 
have therefore only used this single variable in the regression model.  
  
Squared difference of Variance of Returns = a + Block(b1) + LTIP(b2) + e 
 
The model has R2 = 0,19 and P= 0,05 with a blockholder coefficient of 0,475 (P>|t|=0,042) and no 
significant impact from LTIP. We find the same results in for the sub-sample that includes firms 
where the CEO has both stock ownership and stock options.   
These sub-sample results indicate that in firms where the CEO has stock options or owns shares in 
the firm, the blockholders are more active in influencing the level of risk taken in M&A decisions. 
We further reason that it is probably not a coincidence that the same large shareholders that have 
decided to reward option- or share-based incentive programs to their CEOs, have a stronger 
influence on the large investment decisions in the firm.  
6.3 Monetary Effect of Results 
To illustrate the effect of the results we have found, picture a firm that has the average market 
capitalization, level of blockholders and LTIP and that is about to acquire another firm. If the bidder 
firm has constant stock ownership ratio set at the average and varies the ratio of the CEO stock 
options the effect on CAR would be as follows. The firm with the minimum level of stock options, 
0, which also is the median, would expect a CAR of 8,07%, while the firm with an average stock 
option ratio (1,32) would expect a CAR of 5,78%. The firm with average market capitalization 
would then have a CAR in monetary value of 887,6 mNOK if it did not have stock options and 
635,7 mNOK if it had the average level as its CEO stock option ratio. This shows that there is a 
substantial net expected loss for option rewarding firms.  
As we have not found any clear relationship between stock ownership and CAR, we cannot expect a 
monetary effect for awarding stocks.  
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7 Discussion and Recommendations 
The ambition of this thesis has been to provide a platform on which shareholders, particularly in 
Norwegian firms, can build their decisions regarding the optimal incentive contract for their CEOs. 
In this section we will discuss our findings about each incentive structure we have considered, and 
present our recommendations.  
Stock Ownership 
We have not found significant relationships between CEO stock ownership and the return and risk 
taking in acquisitions. The regressions we have done point to a negative trend to both return and 
risk taking, but we cannot find statistical support for these trends. However, sub-sample analysis 
shows that for firms that reward stock options, there is a significant negative relationship between 
stock ownership and risk taking. 
The effect of CEO stock ownership on the return from acquisitions has been debated in the existent 
research. While most of the researchers agree that there is a positive relationship in US firms, Wright 
et al. (2002) find a positive non-linear relationship between the two variables. Our research cannot 
establish that there is a similar relationship in Norway.  
The negative trend we see for the relationship between stock ownership and risk taking is supported 
by the significant negative relationship we find for the sub-sample of option rewarding firms. 
Furthermore, there are an almost equal number of US researchers that find a negative relationship 
between the variables as those that find a positive. This shows that this is a debated area and that 
our finding of no relationship is therefore not controversial.  
Agency theory predicts that stock ownership can affect the CEO to increase both the risk taking and 
the return in an acquisition decision. Even though we cannot exclude the possibility that there is a 
relationship that our analysis has not been able to capture, we can conclude that stock ownership 
does not appear to be a very efficient tool for increasing risk taking and return in M&A. As it is 
costly for shareholders to award stocks to their CEOs, we cannot recommend awarding stocks as 
long as there is not a significant positive relationship to risk and return. As we have found weak 
negative correlations to both variables, we conclude that shareholders should not award stocks to 
their CEOs.  
 
 
 
 
 
We recommend that shareholders refrain from rewarding shares to their CEOs. 
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We recommend that shareholders refrain from awarding stock options to their CEOs. 
Stock Options 
We have found that CEO stock options are significantly related to decreased returns in M&A, and 
that there is no apparent effect of stock options on risk taking. This is in direct contradiction to the 
positive relationship we find in the collected US research and to the predictions of agency theory. 
Sanders and Hambrick (2007) are the only ones who to a certain extent support our notion that 
there is a net loss for shareholders with use of option compensation. They find that excessive risk 
taking leads CEOs with stock options to induce a net loss for the shareholders. However, they find 
that lower option ratios will not cause these excessive risks, and therefore they still recommend 
using stock options in CEO compensation as long as the ratio does not exceed 20-50% of the total 
compensation. For our sample, even these low levels appear to induce losses.  
As our results are so definitely in opposition to the consensus in the US research, we have to 
consider if there is a weakness in our research that causes the divergence, rather than real differences 
between Norway and the US. The small sample size could be a factor that confounds the results, as 
firms where the CEO holds stock options only made 32 of the transactions in the sample. However, 
as our findings are in line with the relationships found for stock ownership, it could also be that 
stock-based incentives do not reduce agency problems in Norwegian firms.  In any case, the 
significant negative relationship we have found between CEO stock options and return from M&A 
is strong enough evidence to convince us that the best advice to shareholders is to avoid the use of 
stock options.  
 
LTIP 
Even though LTIP is not found to be significantly related to return and risk taking, we do find the 
results to be consistently negative and in contradiction to our expectation of a positive effect on 
both risk and return. The weak results might be explained by the difficulties in measuring the 
incentive. Based on the consistently positive results found in the US research from our literature 
review, we would have expected a positive relationship in Norway as well. However, our research 
shows that there is reason to believe that there are significant differences in the effect of incentives 
in Norway and the US. Therefore, we suggest further research on this mechanism with a more 
detailed measure of LTIP to capture its true effect.  
Size and the presence of Blockholders  
We find no significant impact of size on the risk taking in M&A with the exception of the sub-
sample of firms that has stock options, where there is a significant positive impact on risk taking. We 
also find that size only has a significant impact on return in the sub-sample of firms that have stock 
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ownership, where size and CAR is significantly negatively related. This shows that there is a stronger 
size effect on risk and return for firms with stock-based incentives.  However, it does not appear 
that these size effects have distorted the findings of the full-sample analyses we have conducted. 
We cannot find a significant relationship between CAR and blockholders, but we do find a 
significant impact on risk for the sub-sample of option rewarding firms. For these firms we see that 
high ownership levels of blockholders are positively tied to the magnitude of the volatility change in 
a significant way. We interpret this result to indicate that firms where CEOs that have stock options 
compensation also have more active shareholders and hence a greater effect of large blockholders. 
Even though it can be difficult to control the shareholder structure, it illustrates that shareholders 
should get involved in constructing the CEO compensation contract in order to get the highest 
return from investments. 
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8 Conclusion 
Our analysis show that there are substantial differences between Norway and the US both in the use 
of CEO incentive structures and in the effect these incentive structures have on the abnormal return 
and risk change stemming from M&A. The most substantial difference between the two countries is 
that while stock options is unanimously declared as a factor that affects both the risk change and the 
return from an M&A positively in US research, we see that in Norway the picture is completely 
reversed. CEO stock options are tied to a significant decrease in abnormal returns from M&A and 
have a slight risk decreasing tendency. These findings lead us to conclude that Norwegian 
shareholders must avoid using CEO stock options until we find evidence to the contrary. The 
divergence of our results from the collected US research imply that there are factors that separate 
Norway and the US, which lead CEOs to react differently to stock options. As mentioned, we 
believe that cultural differences can be such a factor.  
The risk incentive of CEO stock ownership is a further point of divergence between the countries. 
We see that while there is a positive non-linear relationship between stock ownership and risk taking 
in the US, we have not been able to identify any relationship in Norway. The incentive effect of 
stock ownership on CAR follows the same pattern, with a cumulative finding of a positive non-
linear relationship in the US, and no apparent relationship in Norway. Again we find that there could 
be that cultural differences cause the CEOs to react differently. 
Although we do not find significant support for a relationship between LTIP and return, there is a 
negative trend, which is in opposition to the US research. One finding that is somewhat in line with 
US research is with regards to the presence of blockholders. We have found that blockholders 
increase risk taking in firms where the CEO owns options in the firm. The size effect we find is 
weak, and where we find it, it is negatively related to return and positively related to risk.   
When we evaluate the totality of our results, we see that there are weak negative trends or a 
significant negative relationship to risk and return for all the incentive mechanisms we have 
considered in our research. Even though most of our findings are merely a lack of a significant 
relationship, the fact that this trend is so consistent leads us to consider if there could be an 
underlying difference between Norway and the US that causes this consistent divergence. We see 
that none of the incentives have a positive relationship to risk or return and this makes us question if 
the incentive mechanisms that have positive effects on agency problems documented in the US, 
have any positive effect on agency problems in Norway.  
The apparent differences between the US and Norway confirm that there is a great need for more 
country specific research on the relationship between CEO incentives and bidder success in M&A. 
We believe that it would be very interesting to see similar studies as the one we have conducted with 
a regional focus on Europe and Asia-Pacific –the largest M&A markets aside from the US. Other 
emerging markets, such as Latin America, could also be interesting areas of focus. Additionally, there 
is a need for further research on incentive effects on M&A in Norway. Primarily, we see that the 
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measure we have used for LTIP is not strong enough to capture its effect on risk and return. We 
therefore advise that subsequent research construct a more detailed measure for LTIP to try and 
find a stronger relationship between these variables.  
We have previously mentioned areas in our research that we believe act as restraints for the ability of 
our results to be generalized. The sample size of 72 transactions is small compared to comparable 
studies in this field and we see that there are several extreme observations in our sample, especially 
with regards to return and firm size.  Although we have tried to control for the extreme outliers, 
these factors limit the extent to which we can generalize the results from our study to other regions. 
However, as both the limited size and the extreme observations are in line with the expectations for 
the Norwegian market, we still believe that our models have valid results within this market.  
Our recommendation is that shareholders should refrain from awarding both stocks and stock 
options as incentives to CEOs, as these will either have no effect or a negative effect on shareholder 
returns. Neither do any of the incentives appear to increase CEO risk taking. LTIP appear to have a 
negative effect on M&A return, but our results are not strong enough to form a basis for a concrete 
recommendation. However, we do find that firms where the CEOs have stock based compensation 
also have more active shareholders and hence a greater effect of large blockholders. Even though it 
can be difficult to control the shareholder structure, it illustrates that shareholders should get 
involved in constructing the CEO compensation contract to better align the risk taking in 
investments with the risk preferences of the shareholders.  
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Appendix A: Summary of  Literature Review 
Summary of the findings in the research on the impact of the bidding executive compensation structure on 
abnormal returns and acquisition propensity.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Article Variable 1 Variable 2 Relationship Sample 
Lewellen et al. 
(1985) 
Stock ownership Abnormal returns Positive 191 US deals (1963-
1981) 
Tehranian et al. 
(1987) 
LTIP 
 
Stock ownership 
Abnormal returns 
 
CAR 
Positive significant 
 
Positive 
164 US acquires 
(1972-1981) 
Travolos and 
Waegelein (1992) 
EBC 
 
LTIP 
CAR 
 
CAR 
Positive 
 
Positive 
266 US acquires 
(1972-1986) 
Hanson and Song 
(1996) 
Stock ownership 
(dual-class) 
 
Stock ownership 
(Single class) 
 
Value of control 
(above average) 
Abnormal returns 
 
 
Abnormal returns 
 
 
Abnormal returns  
Negative significant 
 
Negative significant 
 
Negative significant 
167 US deals (dual 
class) (1964-1990) 
Bliss and Rosen 
(2001) 
High EBC M&A activity 
 
Negative 32 US banks (1986-
1995) 
Datta et al. (2001) EBC 
 
High EBC 
CAR 
 
Abnormal returns 
Positive significant 
 
Positive 
1719 US deals (1993-
1998) 
Sanders (2001) Stock ownership 
 
 
 
 
Stock options 
ROA 
 
Acquisition 
propensity  
 
ROA 
 
Acquisition 
propensity  
Positive 
 
Negative 
 
 
Positive significant 
 
Positive 
250 US firms (1991-
1995) 
Wright et al. (2002) Stock ownership 
 
Stock options 
CAR 
 
CAR 
Quadratic 
 
Positive significant 
163 US firms (1993-
1997) 
Swanstrom (2006) EBC 
 
Wealth sensitivity 
Abnormal returns 
 
Abnormal returns 
Negative 
 
Positive 
294 US deals (1994-
1998) 
Williams and Rao 
(2006) 
Stock options 
 
Equity return 
volatility  
Positive significant 127 US firms (1994-
1996) 
Yang et al. (2010) PPS CAR Positive 64 US banks (1991-
2005) 
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Summary of the findings in the research on the impact of the bidding executive compensation structure on 
risk-taking and diversification. 
Article Variable 1 Variable 2 Relationship Sample 
Amihud & Lev 
(1981) 
Size of largest 
blockholder 
Diversification (R2) Negative significant 309 US mergers 
(1961-1970) 
Agrawal & 
Mandelker (1987) 
Ratio of CEO annual 
compensation in 
equity holdings 
Diversification 
(variance change) 
Negative significant 
(PS) 
209 US firms (1974-
1982) 
Lloyd et al. (1987) Size of largest 
blockholder 
Diversification (R2) Negative significant 371 US firms (1971-
1980) 
Lewellen et al. 
(1989) 
Firm equity held by 
CEO (% and value) 
Diversification 
(variance change) 
Insignificant 
relationship (NR) 
203 US firms (1963-
1984) 
Saunders et al. 
(1990) 
Officers’ and 
directors’ 
stockholdings (%) 
Unsystematic risk 
taking 
Positive significant 
(PS) 
38 US banks 
(1979-1982) 
May (1995) Ratio of CEO wealth 
in company stock 
Diversification 
(covariance) 
Positive significant 
(NS) 
184 US deals (1979-
1990) 
Shekar & Torby 
(1995) 
 
Equity ownership of 
outside blockholders 
Diversification 
(industry segments) 
No significant 
relationship 
118 Australian firms  
(1994-2001) 
Level of manager 
ownership (%) 
Diversification 
(industry segments) 
Positive significant 
(NS) 
Servaes (1996) Stock ownership 
(1961-70) 
Diversification 
(industry segments) 
Positive significant 
(NR) 
218 US firms (1961-
1976) 
Stock ownership 
(1973-76) 
Diversification 
(industry segments) 
Negative (NR) 
Denis et al. (1997) 
 
Director and officer 
stock holdings (%) 
Diversification 
(several measures) 
Negative significant 
(PS) 
933 US firms (1984) 
Equity ownership of 
outside blockholders 
Diversification 
(industry segments) 
Negative 
Lane et al. (1998) Size of largest 
blockholder 
Diversification 
(Rumelt, 1974) 
No relationship 289 US mergers 
(1980-1987) 
Andersen et al. 
(2000) 
Outside directors 
(blockholders), 
higher rates of 
management 
turnover  
Diversification Positive 158 US firms 
(1985-1994) 
Equity based 
compensation, 
lower insider 
ownership 
Specialization Positive 
Sanders (2001) 
 
Value of stocks held 
by CEO 
Risk taking 
(acquisition activity) 
Negative significant 
(NS) 
250 US firms (1991-
1995) 
Value of CEO stock 
options 
Risk taking 
(acquisition activity) 
Positive significant 
Sudarsanam & 
Huang (2006) 
 
Sensitivity of CEO 
wealth to stock price 
(Delta) 
Risk increase 
(standard deviation) 
Negative significant 
(NS) 
3069 US acquisitions 
(1993-2004) 
Sensitivity of CEO 
wealth to stock 
return vol. (Vega) 
Risk increase 
(standard deviation) 
Positive significant 
Sanders & 
Hambrick (2007) 
Stock option 
pay/total 
compensation 
Risk taking 
(acquisition activity) 
Positive significant 950 US firms (1993-
2000) 
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Appendix B: Comparison to earlier research 
 
Article CAR  
(%) 
Volatility Stock 
Ownership 
Stock 
Options 
Total 
Compensation 
LTIP Blockholders Sample 
Lewellen 
et al. 
(1985) 
-2,88  X Mean:  
315.2, 
Median:  
5,3 
X $221,294 X X 191 US 
deals 
(1963-
1981) 
Tehranian 
et al. 
(1987) 
-1,16 X X X X 0,28 X 164 US 
acquire
s (1972-
1981) 
Travolos 
and 
Waegelein 
(1992) 
X X X X X 0,37 X 266 US 
acquire
s (1972-
1986) 
Hanson 
and Song 
(1996) 
X X X X X X X 167 US 
deals 
(dual 
class) 
(1964-
1990) 
Bliss and 
Rosen 
(2001) 
X X X X X X X 32 US 
banks 
(1986-
1995) 
Datta et al. 
(2001) 
2,0 X X X X X X 1719 
US 
deals 
(1993-
1998) 
Sanders 
(2001) 
X X $4,840,000 $924,000 $1,335,000 X 0,12 250 US 
firms 
(1991-
1995) 
Wright et 
al. (2002) 
-0,50 X 
 
$34 million $16 
million 
X X X 163 US 
firms 
(1993-
1997) 
Swanstro
m (2006) 
-2,71 X X X X X X 294 US 
deals 
(1994-
1998) 
Williams 
and Rao 
(2006) 
X X X $5.848 
million 
$2.461 million X X 127 US 
firms 
(1994-
1996) 
Yang et al. 
(2010) 
0,24 X X X X X X 64 US 
banks 
(1991-
2005) 
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Article CAR Volatility Stock 
Ownership 
Stock 
Options 
Total 
Compensation 
LTIP Blockholders Sample 
Amihud & 
Lev (1981) 
X X X X X X X 309 US 
mergers 
(1961-1970) 
Agrawal & 
Mandelker 
(1987) 
X X X X X X X 209 US firms 
(1974-1982) 
Lloyd et al. 
(1987) 
X X X X X X  371 US firms 
(1971-1980) 
Lewellen et 
al. (1989) 
X Ratio: 
1,349 
$30,7 
million 
X X X X 203 US firms 
(1963-1984) 
Saunders et 
al. (1990) 
X X X X X X X 38 US banks 
(1979-1982) 
May (1995) X X X X X X X 184 US deals 
(1979-1990) 
Shekar & 
Torby 
(1995) 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X X X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
118 
Australian 
firms  
(1994-2001) 
Servaes 
(1996) 
X 
 
X 
 
X X X X X 218 US firms 
(1961-1976) 
Denis et al. 
(1997) 
 
X X X X X X X 933 US firms 
(1984) 
Lane et al. 
(1998) 
X X X X X X X 289 US 
mergers 
(1980-1987) 
Andersen et 
al. (2000) 
X X X X X X X  
Sanders 
(2001) 
 
X X $4,840,000 $924,000 $1,335,000 X 0,12 250 US firms 
(1991-1995) 
Sudarsanam 
& Huang 
(2006) 
 
X X X X X X X 3069 US 
acquisitions 
(1993-2004) 
 
Sanders & 
Hambrick 
(2007) 
X X $831 
million  
X $10 965 
million 
X X 950 US firms 
(1993-2000) 
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Appendix C: Regression Results including 
Outliers 
 
CAR Coefficient P>|t| R2 P 
   0,1648 0,1018 
MCap -3,6e-07 0,447   
Stock Option Ratio -0,018 0,424   
Stock Option Ratio2 0,000069 0,969   
Stock Ownership Ratio 0,0014 0,027   
Stock Ownership Ratio2 -2,6e-06 0,064   
Blockholders -0,13 0,730   
LTIP 0,013 0,785   
Constant 0,084 0,127   
  Results from the regression analysis on CAR (full sample). 
Volatility Difference Coefficient P>|t| R2 P 
   0,1953 0,0440 
MCap 2,76e-07 0,732   
Stock Option Ratio -0,0582 0,876   
Stock Option Ratio2 0,000453 0,881   
Stock Ownership Ratio -0,00346 0,002   
Stock Ownership Ratio2 5,71e-06 0,018   
Blockholders 0,350 0,569   
LTIP 0,0496 0,616   
Constant -0,0335 0,715   
Results from regression analysis on volatility difference (full sample). 
 
Volatility Difference2 Coefficient P>|t| R2 P 
   0,2350 0,0129 
MCap -4,08e-08 0,957   
Stock Option Ratio 0,00359 0,919   
Stock Option Ratio2 -0,000813 0,777   
Stock Ownership Ratio 0,00376 0,000   
Stock Ownership Ratio2 -6,34e-06 0,006   
Blockholders 0,00219 0,997   
LTIP -0,0849 0,260   
Constant 0,0814 0,352   
Results from regression analysis on volatility difference2 (full sample). 
 
  
Announcement 
Date 
Completion 
Date 
Deal 
Value 
$ (m) 
Target Target 
Nationality 
Target Business 
Description 
Acquirer Acquirer Business 
Description 
Equity 
Value $ 
(m) 
19.03.2007 19.03.2007 559.59 Property Portfolio 
(the Malon 
property 
portfolio, 
Sweden) 
Sweden Portfolio of properties. Acta Holding 
ASA 
Provision of investment 
and savings advice. 
559.59 
30.07.2004 30.07.2004 214.97 Olympia Capital 
ASA 
Norway A financial services group. 
Specialising in acquisition, 
reconstruction and 
management of under-
performing loan 
portfolios. 
Aktiv Kapital 
ASA 
Collection agency. Collects 
past due and defaulted 
payments for banks and 
finance companies. 
214.97 
11.05.2006 16.06.2006 377.30 Denerco Oil A/S Denmark Up stream oil and gas 
group. 
Altinex ASA Provides equipment and 
services for the oil 
industry. 
377.30 
21.02.2007 31.07.2007 614.97 APL ASA 
(89.9%) 
Norway Supplier of production 
and loading systems to the 
offshore oil and gas 
industry. 
Bergesen 
Worldwide 
Offshore Ltd 
Oil and gas rig operator. 607.38 
26.03.2007 26.03.2007 271.50 Prevesta AB Sweden Prefabricated houses 
manufacturer. 
Block Watne 
ASA 
Construction company. 217.06 
15.04.2004 07.05.2004 4.31 FM-Kartta Oy Finland Provider of Geographic 
Information Systems, 
aerial photography, and 
digital mapping products 
and services. 
Blom ASA The company operates in 
lands surveying, industrial 
surveying, map production 
and maritime. They also 
provide navigation, 
hydrographic mapping, 
engineering and software 
services. 
4.31 
31.01.2005 31.01.2005 6.85 Simmons 
Aerofilm Ltd 
(66.667%) 
United 
Kingdom 
Map data provider. Blom ASA The company operates in 
lands surveying, industrial 
surveying, map production 
and maritime. They also 
provide navigation, 
hydrographic mapping, 
engineering and software 
services. 
10.28 
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Announcement 
Date 
Completion 
Date 
Deal 
Value 
$ (m) 
Target Target 
Nationality 
Target Business 
Description 
Acquirer Acquirer Business 
Description 
Equity 
Value $ 
(m) 
22.05.2006 22.05.2006 27.82 Scanrope AS Norway Manufacturer of fibre and 
steel wire rope. 
Blom ASA The company operates in 
lands surveying, industrial 
surveying, map production 
and maritime. They also 
provide navigation, 
hydrographic mapping, 
engineering and software 
services. 
27.82 
27.04.2006 26.06.2006 272.15 Fouquet Sacop 
SA 
France Shipping company which 
operates tankers carrying 
methane, oil and various 
chemical products. 
Camillo 
Eitzen & Co 
ASA 
Shipping company. 272.15 
02.09.1999 31.10.1999 96.31 Fastighets AB 
Balder (Swedish 
Hotel Operations) 
Sweden Hotel operations. Choice Hotels 
Scandanavia 
ASA 
Manages hotels and 
restaurants, as well as 
offers consulting and 
administration services. 
96.31 
04.09.2006 30.09.2006 144.80 CTC Marine 
Projects Ltd 
United 
Kingdom 
Submarine cable 
installation. 
DeepOcean 
ASA 
Subsea support services 
provider for the oil- and 
gas-sector. 
144.80 
25.08.2009 22.12.2009 284.48 Aker Exploration 
ASA 
Norway Oil and gas exploration 
company. 
Det norske 
oljeselskap 
ASA - 
DETNOR 
Oil exploration company. 231.77 
12.11.2009 12.11.2009 1.12 Best Media AS Norway Provider of 
telecommunication 
services. 
Dolphin 
Interconnect 
Solutions 
ASA 
Provider of solutions to 
interconnect servers and 
computer systems. 
1.13 
14.04.2005 14.04.2005 30.00 Oil & Gas Assets 
(producing oil and 
gas fields in 
Texas) 
United 
States 
undisclosed working 
interest in the producing 
oil and gas fields located 
in Polk and San Jacinto 
Counties in Texas 
Ecuanor ASA Exploration and 
production company for 
oil and minerals. 
30.00 
22.04.2008  1 
874.90 
TietoEnator Oyj Finland Provides IT services. EDB Business 
Partners ASA 
Computer software and 
services firm. 
1874.90 
09.01.2008 11.02.2008 221.73 Is Partner AS Norway Software company. EDB Business 
Partners ASA 
Computer software and 
services firm. 
221.73 
7
0
 
  
Announcement 
Date 
Completion 
Date 
Deal 
Value 
$ (m) 
Target Target 
Nationality 
Target Business 
Description 
Acquirer Acquirer Business 
Description 
Equity 
Value $ 
(m) 
29.05.2006 20.10.2006 314.76 Nera ASA Norway Supplier of satellite 
communications 
equipment and systems 
for terrestrial radio 
transmission. 
Eltek ASA Makes and markets 
products and systems for 
professional use within the 
areas of electric energy and 
fire safety 
314.76 
20.06.2005 19.07.2005 3.80 Pro Consulting 
AS (98.9%) 
Norway Develops internet 
software solutions for the 
financial sector. 
Exense ASA IT consultant and software 
company. 
3.84 
20.03.2002  440.36 Cermaq ASA Norway Fish feeding, farming and 
milling company. 
Fjord Seafood 
ASA 
Integrated salmon farming 
and wholesaler. 
440.36 
18.06.2008 15.01.2009 52.32 Fortum Oyj 
(Infrastructure 
Business Unit/ 
Norway) 
Norway Infrastructure business 
unit/ Norway 
Hafslund 
Infratek ASA 
Electrical and telecom 
infrastructure services 
company. 
52.32 
11.04.2005 24.01.2006 16.97 Vogon 
International Ltd 
United 
Kingdom 
Data recovery services. Ibas Holding 
AS 
Provider of solutions for 
data recovery. 
16.97 
14.02.2008 12.03.2008 137.90 Spectron Group 
plc 
United 
Kingdom 
Intermediary broker. Imarex ASA Operator of market places 
for commodities and their 
derivatives and conducts 
clearing and settlement of 
transactions. 
137.90 
03.06.2008 19.09.2008 19.54 Exense ASA Norway IT consultant and 
software company. 
Inmeta ASA Holding company 
focusing on software 
services companies. 
19.54 
03.04.2006 01.09.2006 97.28 NOS ASA (80%) Norway Clearing bank. Imarex ASA Central exchange for 
Freight Derivatives. 
121.60 
15.10.2007 28.12.2007 560.00 Teleflex Inc 
(Global 
Automotive 
Business) 
United 
States 
Global Automotive 
Business 
Kongsberg 
Automotive 
ASA 
Manufacturer of 
automobile parts, 
including brakes, steeering 
and wheel systems, 
transmissions and 
stabilizers. 
560.00 
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Announcement 
Date 
Completion 
Date 
Deal 
Value 
$ (m) 
Target Target 
Nationality 
Target Business 
Description 
Acquirer Acquirer Business 
Description 
Equity 
Value $ 
(m) 
02.03.2007 02.03.2007 13.57 Genpoint AS Denmark Diagnostics company. NorDiag ASA Biotechnology company. 13.57 
17.11.2008  20.51 NattoPharma Norway Exclusive sales and 
marketing rights to the 
natural Vitamin K2 from 
Natto, also biologically 
active molecules with 
clearly documented 
effects in major disease 
areas. 
Nordic Health 
ASA 
Health and body care 
company. 
20.41 
03.07.2006 03.07.2006 391.40 Hotels (15 hotel 
properties and 1 
congress centre, 
Finland) 
Finland 15 hotel properties and 1 
congress centre, Finland. 
NorGani 
Hotels ASA 
Real estate investment 
company specializing in 
the hotel sector. 
391.40 
03.04.2000 28.07.2000 2 
453.04 
Fletcher 
Challenge Paper 
Ltd 
New 
Zealand 
Paper manufacturing and 
distribution, company that 
produces communication 
papers, market kraft pulp 
and related forestry 
products. Operator of 11 
million paper mills in 
seven different countries. 
Norske 
Skogindustrier 
ASA 
Produces long and short 
fibre sulphate pulp, 
newsprint, bleached kraft 
paper and other papers as 
well producing sawn 
timber, chipboard, 
wallboard, parquet 
flooring and other building 
materials. 
791.85 
29.05.2001 21.11.2001 945.87 G Haindl'sche 
Papierfabriken 
KGaA (Paper 
mills Walsum and 
Parenco) 
Germany Manufacturer of paper. Norske 
Skogindustrier 
ASA 
Producer of long and 
short fibre sulphate pulp, 
newsprint, bleached kraft 
paper and other papers as 
well as sawn timber, 
chipboard, wallboard, 
parquet flooring and other 
building materials. 
945.87 
07.09.2005 17.11.2005 930.00 Pan Asia Paper 
Co Pte Ltd (50%) 
Singapore Manufacturer of 
newsprint. 
Norske 
Skogindustrier 
ASA 
Producer and supplier of 
paper and forest products. 
1260.00 
02.11.2007 02.11.2007 76.40 DSV A/S 
(Headquarter and 
main logistic hub) 
Denmark Headquarter and main 
logistic hub. 
Northern 
Logistic 
Property ASA 
Logistic property 
company. 
76.40 
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Announcement 
Date 
Completion 
Date 
Deal 
Value 
$ (m) 
Target Target 
Nationality 
Target Business 
Description 
Acquirer Acquirer Business 
Description 
Equity 
Value $ 
(m) 
06.03.2006 06.03.2006 1 
596.00 
Marine Harvest 
International BV 
Netherlands Fish farming and 
processing group. 
Pan Fish ASA Involved in fish farming 
and aquaculture. 
1596.00 
22.01.2001 31.03.2001 204.78 Nortrans 
Offshore Ltd 
Singapore Manufacturer of flooting 
production vessels for oil 
and gas exploration. 
Prosafe ASA Owns, lesses and manages 
moveable accommodation 
platforms (flotels), oil 
platforms, drilling rigs, 
ships and related products. 
204.78 
16.04.2008 26.08.2008 68.08 CashGuard AB 
(74.95%) 
Sweden Develops and 
manufactures products 
aimed at increasing 
security when handling 
cash in any retail 
environment. 
PSI Group 
ASA 
IT company. 72.45 
05.12.2007 27.02.2008 258.00 Palace 
Exploration Co 
UK Ltd 
United 
Kingdom 
Petroleum exploration. Revus Energy 
ASA 
Oil and gas company. 258.00 
07.06.2006 14.07.2006 746.89 Trader Classified 
Media NV 
(Trading 
Operations in 
Spain, France, 
Italy, Switzerland 
and Latin 
America) 
Netherlands Trading Operations in 
Spain, France, Italy, 
Switzerland and Latin 
America. 
Schibsted 
ASA 
Media group. 746.89 
20.12.2007 23.01.2008 10.87 Fire Eater A/S 
(51%) 
Denmark Developing and 
producing of fixed fire 
extinguishing systems. 
Simtronics 
ASA 
Gas and fire detectors for 
industrial use. 
21.31 
13.04.2007  312.27 REM Offshore 
ASA (63.42%) 
Norway Fishing and offshore 
services company. 
Solstad 
Offshore ASA 
Offshore supply vessel 
operator. 
325.96 
06.03.2006 06.03.2006 270.00 Mining Assets 
(Offshore oil rig 
Stena Dee, 
Norway.) 
Norway Offshore oil rig Stena 
Dee, Norway. 
Songa 
Offshore ASA 
Offshore oil drilling 
machinery provider. 
270.00 
17.06.2008 17.06.2008 428.50 Mining Assets 
(Oil mining 
assets) 
Norway Oil mining assets. Songa 
Offshore ASA 
Offshore oil drilling 
contractor. 
428.50 
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Announcement 
Date 
Completion 
Date 
Deal 
Value 
$ (m) 
Target Target 
Nationality 
Target Business 
Description 
Acquirer Acquirer Business 
Description 
Equity 
Value $ 
(m) 
27.04.2005 27.04.2005 117.61 Property Portfolio 
(Piresenteret 
Office Complex, 
Trondheim, 
Norway) 
Norway Piresenteret Office 
Complex, Trondheim, 
Norway. 
Sparebanken 
1 Midt-Norge 
ASA 
Savings bank. 117.61 
20.12.2004  164.86 Romsdals 
Fellesbank A/S 
(Bid No 2) 
Norway Commercial bank. Sparebanken 
More 
Savings bank. 164.86 
05.12.2006 17.09.2007 35.89 Fokus Bank ASA 
(Operations in the 
Sogn og Fjordane 
County, Norway) 
Norway Five branches, their 
employees and all 
customer activities in the 
Sogn og Fjordane County. 
Sparebanken 
Vest 
Commercial banking 
services, securities 
management, insurance 
and other financial 
services. 
35.90 
18.12.2006 01.10.2007 30 
464.19 
Norsk Hydro 
ASA (Oil and gas 
activities) 
Norway Oil and gas activities. Statoil ASA Petroleum exploration, 
production, and 
marketing. 
30464.19 
01.12.2004 20.12.2004 214.70 Shopping Centers 
(Field's shopping 
centre in 
Copenhagen) 
Denmark Field's shopping centre in 
Copenhagen. 
Steen & 
Strom Invest 
ASA 
Real estate investment and 
management company. 
The company owns and 
manages shopping Centers 
in Oslo and other areas in 
Norway and Sweden. 
429.41 
03.09.2007 21.12.2007 2 
642.74 
SPP Livforsakring 
AB; 
Handelsbanken 
Life & Pensions 
Ltd; 
SPP Fonder AB 
Sweden Mutual insurance 
company. 
Storebrand 
ASA 
Holding company for 
insurance and banking 
group. 
2642.74 
02.02.2004  106.25 Norman ASA Norway Develops and markets 
data protection software. 
Sells total integrated data 
security solutions. 
Tandberg 
Data ASA 
The company 
manufactures data storage 
products, displays and 
keyboards, tape drives, 
data storage solutions and 
tape duplication and 
qualification systems. 
106.25 
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Announcement 
Date 
Completion 
Date 
Deal 
Value 
$ (m) 
Target Target 
Nationality 
Target Business 
Description 
Acquirer Acquirer Business 
Description 
Equity 
Value $ 
(m) 
31.08.2006 31.08.2006 28.00 Exabyte Corp United 
States 
Provider of data storage 
solutions 
Tandberg 
Data ASA 
Manufactures tape storage 
management solutions for 
businesses. 
28.00 
25.09.1999 25.09.1999 279.35 News Digital 
Systems Ltd 
(Digital 
Broadcasting 
Business) 
United 
Kingdom 
Digital Broadcasting 
Business 
Tandberg 
Television 
ASA 
Manufactures and sells 
products and systems for 
coded ,television signals. 
279.35 
30.07.2007  1 
363.97 
Wavefield Inseis 
AS 
Norway Marine geophysical 
company. 
TGS-NOPEC 
Geophysical 
Co ASA 
Offers geophysical 
consulting and contracting 
services to oil companies. 
1156.99 
30.04.2007 25.05.2007 100.76 Sense EDM AS Norway Industrial drilling 
equipment. 
TTS Marine 
ASA 
Designs, develops and 
supplies ships and 
shipyard equipment. 
Formerly known as TTS 
Technology ASA. 
100.76 
28.12.2001 28.12.2001 17.71 Hamworthy KSE 
AB 
Sweden Manufacturer of dry cargo 
handling equipment. 
TTS 
Technology 
ASA 
Manufacturer of shipping 
equipment, organised in 
three divisions: Marine & 
Offshore Cranes and 
Equipment, Cargo 
Handling & Cargo Access 
Equipment and Material 
Handling. 
17.71 
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Announcement 
Date 
Completion 
Date 
Deal 
Value 
$ (m) 
Target Target 
Nationality 
Target Business 
Description 
Acquirer Acquirer Business 
Description 
Equity 
Value $ 
(m) 
07.02.2001 26.07.2001 75.73 SPCS-Gruppen 
ASA 
Norway Company develops, 
markets and distributes 
financial business 
software systems for small 
and medium sized 
companies. 
Visma ASA Develops, manufactures 
and sells computer 
software and data 
processing systems for 
industry and ship 
management. Also 
provides outsourcing 
services in accounting and 
finance. 
75.73 
         
25.08.2003 23.10.2003 12.06 Photonyx Ltd Norway Research facility 
specialized in micro 
technology. Developer of 
optical telecom products. 
WiCom ASA Provides data base 
information retrieval and 
logistics systems and 
services. System integrator 
with competence within 
wireless communication 
network, IP based services 
and network 
infrastructure. 
12.06 
05.12.2003 05.12.2003 2.24 Smartnet AS Norway ICT infrastructure 
integrator. 
WiCom ASA Provides data base 
information retrieval and 
logistics systems and 
services. System integrator 
with competence within 
wireless communication 
network, IP based services 
and network 
infrastructure. 
2.24 
15.10.2009 15.10.2009 3.61 A-com Norge 
ASA 
Norway Marketing communication 
company. 
Zoncolan 
ASA 
Investment company. 3.61 
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